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作者：Kondor, Peter; Zawadowski, Adam
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Central European University
摘要：We present a novel entry-game with endogenous information acquisition to study the welfare effects of opacity and competition. Potential entrants to an opaque market are uncertain about their competitive advantage relative to other investors, i.e. their type. They construct optimal costly signals to learn about their types, where the marginal cost of learning captures the opacity of the market. In general, the individually optimal entry and learning decisions are socially suboptimal. Players o...
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作者：Wakker, Peter P.; Yang, Jingni
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Australian National University
摘要：This paper shows that convexity of preference has stronger implications for weighted utility models than had been known hitherto, both for utility and for weighting functions. Our main theorem derives concave utility from convexity of preference on the two-dimensional comonotonic cone, without presupposing continuity. We then show that this, seemingly marginal, result provides the strongest tool presently available for obtaining concave/convex utility or weighting functions. We revisit many cl...
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作者：Beauchene, Dorian; Li, Jian; Li, Ming
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Concordia University - Canada; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We study a persuasion game a la Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) where players are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989). With no prior ambiguity, a Sender may choose to use ambiguous communication devices. Our main result characterizes the value of optimal ambiguous persuasion, which is often higher than what is feasible under Bayesian persuasion. We characterize posteriors that are potentially plausible when they are generated by ambiguous devices. One way t...
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作者：Al-Najjar, Nabil I.; Shmaya, Eran
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We explore how the Epstein Zin utility captures an agent's sensitivity to parameter uncertainty. Our main result is a closed-form representation of the Epstein Zin utility for an i.i.d. consumption process with unknown parameter, as the discount factor approaches 1. Using this representation, and under the usual assumption about the relationship between risk aversion and the attitude towards time smoothing, we show that the agent is averse to parameter uncertainty. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All r...
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作者：Dew-Becker, Ian; Nathanson, Charles G.
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper examines the implications of learning for the effects of ambiguity aversion. The key result is that since agents naturally choose to learn about the sources of uncertainty that reduce utility the most, information acquisition attenuates the most severe effects of ambiguity aversion. The specific setting we study is the canonical consumption/savings problem. Agents endogenously learn most about income dynamics at the very lowest frequencies. While ambiguity aversion typically implies...
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作者：Hayashi, Takashi; Lombardi, Michele
作者单位：University of Glasgow
摘要：Consider a society with two sectors (issues or objects) that faces a design problem. Suppose that the sector-2 dimension of the design problem is fixed and represented by a mechanism Gamma(2), and that the designer operates under this constraint for institutional reasons. A sector-1 mechanism Gamma(1) constrained implements a social choice rule phi in Nash equilibrium if for each profile of agents' preferences, the set of (pure) Nash equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism Gamma(1) x Gamma(2) pl...
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作者：Lang, Ruitian
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：This paper develops a model of dynamic information acquisition where a buyer acquires information about a product, and a monopoly seller sets the price of her product anticipating the buyer's behavior. It finds that the buyer makes a purchase decision when his expected gain from trade hits one of two boundaries which are deterministic functions of time. Those boundaries are independent of the buyer's prior value. The seller's profit is increasing in the buyer's cost of information if and only ...
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作者：Nimark, Kristoffer P.; Sundaresan, Savitar
作者单位：Cornell University; Imperial College London
摘要：Disagreement persists over issues that have objective truths. In the presence of increasing amounts of data, such disagreement should vanish, but it is nonetheless observable. This paper studies persistent disagreement in a model where rational Bayesian agents learn about an unobservable state of the world through noisy signals. We show that agents (i) choose signal structures that are more likely to reinforce their prior beliefs and (ii) choose less informative signals when their prior belief...
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作者：Afacan, Mustafa Oguz
作者单位：Sabanci University
摘要：We introduce a novel school-choice with vouchers model. A feasibility notion is defined to incorporate the constraint that students from low-income families need a voucher to go to a private school. We then introduce a stability notion, while emphasizing that the traditional school-choice model and usual stability notion are realized as a special case of our formulation. A class of feasible, stable, and constrained efficient mechanisms is proposed. However, feasibility and stability are incomp...
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作者：Bloise, G.; Citanna, A.
作者单位：Yeshiva University
摘要：We study the effect of asset shortages on liquidity in economies with limited enforcement of debt contracts. We establish that, under a suitable assumption in terms of gains from trade, liquidity does not dry up and trading volumes do not disappear as credit conditions worsen. The equilibrium outcome becomes arbitrarily close to a purely speculative equilibrium, and bubbles occur in the limit. The result applies to incomplete markets and, more generally, to equilibria where collateral constrai...
