Optimal crowdfunding design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ellman, Matthew; Hurkens, Sjaak
• 署名单位: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Barcelona School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104939
• 发表日期: 2019
• 关键词: Crowdfunding; mechanism design; Entrepreneurial finance; Market-testing; adaptation; Rent-extraction

摘要

This paper characterizes profit- and welfare-maximizing reward-based crowdfunding, defined by an aggregate funding threshold for production. We disentangle crowdfunding's selling and funding roles, locating its key benefit in its market test role of adapting production to demand. Multiple prices prove necessary for effective learning and adaptation, even with relatively large crowds. Mechanism design proves general optimality in our baseline and shows the value of limiting reward quantities. Funding is not fundamental and crowdfunding may even complement traditional finance. We characterize welfare consequences, model price dynamics and identify platform designs and regulations that enhance innovation and social benefits. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.