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作者：Matveenko, Andrei; Mikhalishchev, Sergei
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague
摘要：In this paper, we introduce a new role of quotas, e.g. labor market quotas: the attentional role. We study the effect of quota implementation on the attention allocation strategy of a rationally inattentive (RI) manager. We find that quotas induce attention: a RI manager who is forced to fulfill a quota, unlike an unrestricted RI manager, never rejects minority candidates without acquiring information about them. We also demonstrate that in our model quotas are behaviorally equivalent to subsi...
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作者：Manjunath, Vikram; Westkamp, Alexander
作者单位：University of Ottawa; University of Cologne
摘要：We study the balanced exchange of indivisible objects without monetary transfers when agents may be endowed with (and consume) more than one object. We propose a natural domain of preferences that we call trichotomous. In this domain, each agent's preference over bundles of objects is responsive to an ordering over objects that has the following three indifference classes, in decreasing order of preferences: desirable objects, objects that she is endowed with but does not consider desirable, a...
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作者：Galeotti, Andrea; Ghiglino, Christian
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; University of Essex
摘要：Cross-ownership smooths firms' idiosyncratic shocks but affects their portfolio choice and, therefore, their risk-taking position. The classical intuition on the role of pooling risk in raising welfare is valid when ownership is evenly dispersed. However, when the ownership of some firms is concentrated in the hands of a few others, deeper integration leads to excessive risk-taking and volatility and, consequently, it results in lower aggregate welfare. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserv...
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作者：Rahi, Rohit
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study the market for a risky asset with uncertain heterogeneous valuations. Agents seek to learn about their own valuation by acquiring private information and making inferences from the equilibrium price. As agents of one type gather more information, they pull the price closer to their valuation and further away from the valuations of other types. Thus they exert a negative learning externality on other types. This in turn implies that a lower cost of information for one type induces all ...
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作者：Gabrovski, Miroslav; Kospentaris, Ioannis
作者单位：University of Hawaii System; University of Hawaii Manoa; Virginia Commonwealth University
摘要：A salient feature of over-the-counter (OTC) markets is intermediation: dealers buy from and sell to customers as well as other dealers. Traditionally, the search-theoretic literature of OTC markets has rationalized this as a consequence of random meetings and ex post bargaining between investors. We show that neither of these are necessary conditions for intermediation. We build a model of a fully decentralized OTC market in which search is directed and sellers post prices ex ante. Intermediat...
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作者：Sadzik, Tomasz; Woolnough, Chris
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We study informational efficiency in a model of strategic dynamic trade with a monopolistic informed trader. The informed trader continuously receives information about the growth rate of asset dividends and trades against market makers and liquidity traders. We show that when the private information is multidimensional, or growth rate of expected dividends is relatively high, private information snowballs over time and the informed trader reveals his information about the asset with delay. Th...
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作者：Chen, Yan; He, YingHua
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Tsinghua University; Rice University
摘要：When participating in school choice, students often spend substantial effort acquiring information about schools. We investigate how two popular mechanisms incentivize students' information acquisition in the laboratory. While students' willingness to pay for information is significantly greater under the Immediate than the Deferred Acceptance mechanism, most students over-invest in information acquisition, especially when they are more curious or believe that others invest more. Additionally,...
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作者：Foerster, Manuel; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.
作者单位：University of Bielefeld; Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：We propose a framework of network formation where players can form two types of links: public links observed by everyone and shadow links generally not observed by others. We introduce a novel solution concept called rationalizable conjectural pairwise stability, which generalizes Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)'s pairwise stability notion to accommodate shadow links. We first show that a network is stable if there exist beliefs such that each player conjectures to be in a network that is stable u...
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作者：Pagnozzi, Marco; Piccolo, Salvatore; Reisinger, Markus
作者单位：University of Naples Federico II; University of Bergamo; Frankfurt School Finance & Management
摘要：We analyze vertical contracting between a manufacturer and retailers who have correlated private information. The manufacturer chooses the number of retailers and secretly contracts with each of them. We highlight how the interplay between the manufacturer's incentive to limit retail competition and the presence of asymmetric information shapes the optimal size of the distribution network. We show that a larger distribution network reduces retailers' information rents, and this may induce the ...
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作者：Benndorf, Volker; Martinez-Martinez, Ismael; Normann, Hans-Theo
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：We propose a model of coupled population games where intra-and intergroup interactions overlap. We analyze the general class of symmetric 2x2 games with coupled replicator dynamics in this framework. Standard one-and two-population predictions extend to a total of ten regions with different sets of attractors, among them novel hybrid points where one population randomizes and the other plays a pure strategy. Building on the theoretical analysis, we run continuous-time laboratory experiments us...
