Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mennle, Timo; Seuken, Sven
• 署名单位: University of Zurich
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105144
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Mechanism design; random assignment; matching; strategyproofness; probabilistic serial; boston mechanism

摘要

We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Informally, a mechanism is partially strategyproof if it makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy for those agents whose preference intensities differ sufficiently between any two objects. We demonstrate that partial strategyproofness is axiomatically motivated and yields a parametric measure for how strategyproof an assignment mechanism is. We apply this new concept to derive novel insights about the incentive properties of the probabilistic serial mechanism and different variants of the Boston mechanism. (C) 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.