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作者：Citanna, A.; Tvede, M.
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; University of Sheffield
摘要：Should the government run an uncertain fiscal policy to finance its liabilities? We call the resulting uncertainty taxspots, and study conditions that make taxspots optimal and recurrent in standard Ramsey problems. We show that prudence and market incompleteness play a role in sustaining taxspots, and that equal-treatment randomizations can be decentralized via taxspots even in the absence of financial markets.
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作者：Spector, Mariano
作者单位：International Monetary Fund
摘要：This paper studies the output effect of transfers in a New Keynesian model with heterogeneous dynasties of overlapping generations, which allows for arbitrary heterogeneity in marginal propensities to consume (MPCs). The role of MPCs is mainly to determine the timing of the fiscal stimulus. Thus, it is not MPCs per se that determine the cumulative effect on output, but rather the interaction between the timing of the stimulus and other features of the model, such as financial frictions and an ...
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作者：Starmans, Jan
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：This paper incorporates a risk-neutral principal -agent problem into a random search model to study contracting and search in general equilibrium. I introduce heterogeneity in principals' and agents' production technologies in terms of the distribution of output across states of nature. Under optimal contracting, this heterogeneity can give rise to complementarity in contracting between specific principal and agent types. In contrast to complementarity in production, complementarity in contrac...
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作者：Han, Seungjin; Sam, Alex; Shin, Youngki
作者单位：McMaster University
摘要：We introduce a notion of competitive signaling equilibrium (CSE) in one-to-one matching markets with a continuum of heterogeneous senders and receivers. We then study monotone CSE where equilibrium outcomes - sender actions, receiver reactions, beliefs, and matching - are all monotone in the stronger set order. We show that if the sender utility is monotone-supermodular and the receiver's utility is weakly monotone-supermodular, a CSE is stronger monotone if and only if it passes Criterion D1 ...
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作者：Mukherjee, Saptarshi; Muto, Nozomu; Sen, Arunava
作者单位：Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Delhi; Hitotsubashi University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：This paper considers implementation in undominated strategies by finite mechanisms, where multiple outcomes may be implemented at a single state of the world. We establish a sufficient condition for implementation applicable in a general environment with private values. We apply it to three well-known environments and obtain strikingly permissive results. In the single -object auction, the second -price auction with a reserve price can be outperformed in terms of revenue. In the public good pr...
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作者：Liu, Yi; Wu, Fan
作者单位：Tsinghua University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We study a mechanism design problem where the allocation rule is randomized and transfers are contingent on outcomes. In this problem, an agent reports his private information, and an exogenous randomized allocation rule assigns an outcome based on the report. A planner designs an outcome-contingent transfer to incentivize the agent to report truthfully. We say that the allocation rule is implementable if such transfers exist. For this implementation problem, we derive two sufficient and neces...
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作者：Menzio, Guido
作者单位：New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; New York University
摘要：I study a version of the search -theoretic model of imperfect competition by Burdett and Judd (1983) in which sellers operate a production technology with decreasing rather than constant returns to scale. Equilibrium exists and is unique, and its structure depends on the extent of search frictions. If search frictions are large enough, the price distribution is non -degenerate and atomless. If search frictions are neither too large nor too small, the price distribution is non -degenerate with ...
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作者：Li, Chen; Wakker, Peter P.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
摘要：This paper provides the most general preference axiomatization of average utility (AU) maximization over infinite sequences presently available, reaching almost complete generality. The only restriction is that all periodic sequences should be contained in the domain. Infinite sequences may designate intertemporal outcomes streams where AU models patience, welfare allocations where AU models fairness, or decisions under ambiguity where AU models complete ignorance. As a methodological contribu...
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作者：Stachurski, John; Wilms, Ole; Zhang, Junnan
作者单位：Australian National University; University of Hamburg; Tilburg University; Xiamen University; Xiamen University
摘要：This paper studies existence and uniqueness of recursive utility in asset pricing models with time preference shocks. We provide conditions that clarify existence and uniqueness for a wide range of models, including exact necessary and sufficient conditions for standard formulations. The conditions isolate the roles of preference parameters, as well as the different risks that drive the consumption and preference shock processes. By deriving and decomposing a stability coefficient for recursiv...
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作者：Burkett, Justin; Rosenthal, Maxwell
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper studies a robust contracting problem with a standard principal and a strictly riskaverse agent who is (i) uncertain about the production technology and (ii) ambiguity-averse in the sense of the Bewley (1986) incomplete preferences criterion. When the agent's uncertainty is sufficiently limited, the optimal contract is fully contingent on the state of the world, as in the classical problem. Conversely, when that uncertainty is sufficiently extensive, the optimal contract is (generica...
