Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mukherjee, Saptarshi; Muto, Nozomu; Sen, Arunava
• 署名单位: Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Delhi; Hitotsubashi University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105783
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Implementation in undominated strategies; Finite mechanisms; Outperforming dominant-strategy; implementation

摘要

This paper considers implementation in undominated strategies by finite mechanisms, where multiple outcomes may be implemented at a single state of the world. We establish a sufficient condition for implementation applicable in a general environment with private values. We apply it to three well-known environments and obtain strikingly permissive results. In the single -object auction, the second -price auction with a reserve price can be outperformed in terms of revenue. In the public good provision problem, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism can be outperformed from the viewpoint of a designer who wishes to minimise deficit subject to efficiency. In the twosided matching environment where preferences on one side of the market are private information, the social choice correspondence that outputs all stable matchings at every preference profile, is implementable.