Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Liu, Yi; Wu, Fan
• 署名单位: Tsinghua University; California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105878
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Mechanism design; implementation; Transfer; Dual cone; Convex envelope

摘要

We study a mechanism design problem where the allocation rule is randomized and transfers are contingent on outcomes. In this problem, an agent reports his private information, and an exogenous randomized allocation rule assigns an outcome based on the report. A planner designs an outcome-contingent transfer to incentivize the agent to report truthfully. We say that the allocation rule is implementable if such transfers exist. For this implementation problem, we derive two sufficient and necessary conditions. Each has a geometric interpretation. Moreover, when the allocation rule is implementable, we construct transfers that implement the allocation rule.