-
作者：Gottardi, Piero; Mezzetti, Claudio
作者单位：University of Essex; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Queensland
摘要：In practice mediation operates through shuttle diplomacy: the mediator goes back and forth between parties, meeting them in private. We model shuttle diplomacy as a dynamic procedure. The mediator helps each party to gradually discover (privately) her value from settlement and re-assess her bargaining position, while also proposing the terms of the deal. We show that shuttle diplomacy always allows parties to achieve an ex-post efficient final settlement. In contrast, this is not possible with...
-
作者：Anthropelos, Michail; Kardaras, Constantinos
作者单位：University of Piraeus; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We consider a financial market in which traders potentially face restrictions in trading some of the available securities. Traders are heterogeneous with respect to their beliefs and risk profiles, and the market is assumed thin: traders strategically trade against their price impacts. We prove existence and uniqueness of a corresponding equilibrium, and provide an efficient algorithm to numerically obtain the equilibrium prices and allocations given market's inputs. We find that restrictions ...
-
作者：Pegoraro, Stefano
作者单位：University of Notre Dame
摘要：In a continuous-time model, a risk-neutral decision-maker chooses the volatility of a state variable and is terminated when the variable falls below a threshold. I provide economically interpretable conditions under which the decision-maker becomes risk averse endogenously and minimizes volatility near termination, even if she faces myopic incentives to gamble for resurrection. The conditions introduce forward-looking incentives to preserve economic rents. I show these conditions are met in a ...
-
作者：Ke, Shaowei; Wu, Brian; Zhao, Chen
作者单位：China Europe International Business School; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Hong Kong
摘要：We introduce a learning model in which the decision maker does not know how recommendations are generated, called the contraction rule. We present behavioral postulates that characterize it. The contraction rule can be uniquely identified and reveals how the decision maker interprets and how much she trusts the recommendation. In a dynamic stationary setting, we show that the contraction rule is not dominated by completely following recommendations and is incompatible with a property called co...
-
作者：Niu, Yingjie; Yang, Jinqiang; Zou, Zhentao
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai Institute of International Finance & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Wuhan University
摘要：We extend a production-based asset pricing model by introducing learning about disaster risk. The information is not perfect, and Bayesian learning is adopted to update beliefs about the likelihood of rare disasters. We show that disaster learning reconciles key stylized facts about macroeconomic quantities and financial markets. For macroeconomic quantities, during the crisis, the decline in aggregate investments is much worse than that of output, whereas the decline in aggregate consumption ...
-
作者：Kratz, Jorgen
作者单位：University of York - UK
摘要：There is no conflict between maximizing the number of transplants and giving priority to, e.g., highly HLA-sensitized recipients in kidney exchange programs that only permit pairwise exchanges. In some programs that feature cyclic exchanges or chains, however, giving priority to some recipients may reduce the number of transplants that can be carried out. This paper identifies the conditions under which there is a trade-off between prioritization and transplant maximization objectives. The res...
-
作者：Bernhard, Pierre
作者单位：Universite Cote d'Azur
摘要：We discuss published accounts of nonlinear equilibrium strategies in linear quadratic differential games. The main reference: Tsutsui-Mino 1990, is shown to be misleading.
-
作者：Fardeau, Vincent
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：I study how (VaR-based) financial constraints affect liquidity and welfare under different structures of the arbitrage industry. When capital is dispersed across competitive arbitrageurs, financial constraints may impair their ability to provide liquidity, lowering other investors' welfare. However, when capital is concentrated among arbitrageurs with market power, introducing constraints can make everyone better off and increase liquidity. Further, alternative constraints (fixed margins, posi...
-
作者：Mendez-Naya, Luciano; Mendez-Naya, Jose
作者单位：Universidade de Santiago de Compostela; Universidade da Coruna
摘要：We study the existence of competitive equilibria in economies with indivisible goods. The first result provides a novel sufficient condition for an economy with indivisible goods to have competitive equilibrium. This condition states that the cooperative game associated with the economy has a non-empty core. Crucially, this sufficient condition is also necessary when the economy is convex. This characterization implies that every two-agent convex economy has at least one competitive equilibrium.
-
作者：Groneck, Max; Ludwig, Alexander; Zimper, Alexander
作者单位：University of Groningen; Goethe University Frankfurt; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Pretoria
摘要：This paper studies discrete time finite horizon life-cycle models with arbitrary discount functions and iso-elastic per period power utility with concavity parameter theta. We distinguish between the savings behavior of a sophisticated versus a naive agent. Although both agent types have identical preferences, they solve different utility maximization problems whenever the model is dynamically inconsistent. Pollak (1968) shows that the savings behavior of both agent types is nevertheless ident...
