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作者：Szydlowski, Martin
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：I study information disclosure as a means to create conflict. A sender aims to keep two parties engaged in a war of attrition and reveals information about their relative strength. In the unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium, the sender employs shifting rhetoric: she alternates pipetting good and bad news about each party, so that neither appears too strong. Information designed to induce one party to continue fighting weakens the other party's incentives. This spillover effect may lead to early ...
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作者：Aleksenko, Stepan; Kohlhepp, Jacob
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We study how delegated recruitment shapes talent selection. Firms often pay recruiters via refund contracts, which specify a payment upon the hire of a suggested candidate and a refund if a candidate is hired but terminated during an initial period of employment. We develop a model of delegated recruitment and show that refund contracts with strong screening incentives lead to statistical discrimination in favor of candidates with more precise productivity information. This contrasts with a fi...
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作者：Cohen, Assa; Kargar, Mahyar; Lester, Benjamin; Weill, Pierre-Olivier
作者单位：Yeshiva University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We develop a search-theoretic model of a dealer-intermediated over-the-counter market. Our key departure from the literature is to assume that, when a customer meets a dealer, the dealer can sell only assets that it already owns. Hence, in equilibrium, dealers choose to hold inventory. . We derive the equilibrium relationship between dealers' costs of holding assets on their balance sheets, their optimal inventory holdings, and various measures of liquidity, including bid-ask spreads, trade si...
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作者：Gerke, Stefanie; Gutin, Gregory; Hwang, Sung-Ha; Neary, Philip R.
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST); University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要：This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are partially shareable along social links. We introduce a model in which each individual in a social network not only decides how much of a shareable good to provide, but also decides which subset of neighbours to nominate as co- beneficiaries. An outcome of the model specifies an endogenously generated subnetwork and a public goods game occurring over the realised subnetwork. We prove the existence of specialised pure strategy Nash equili...
