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作者：Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
作者单位：Tilburg University
摘要：We introduce the notion of expectational equilibrium in a general specification of the many-toone matching with contracts model. The endogenous variables in an expectational equilibrium are expectations about tradable contracts. Expectational equilibrium outcomes are equivalent to stable outcomes. Expectational equilibrium unifies all the other approaches used in the literature so far, in particular Walrasian equilibrium, Dreze equilibrium, and market clearing cutoffs. It also applies to cases...
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作者：Echenique, Federico; Goel, Sumit; Lee, Sangmok
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We study stable allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods. The problem is well-known to be challenging, and rich enough to express fundamentally unstable economies, such as the roommate problem. Our approach stems from generalizing the original study of an exchange economy with unit demand and unit endowments, the housing model. . Our first approach uses Scarf's theorem, and proposes sufficient conditions under which a convexify then round technique ensures that the core is non...
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作者：Correa, Alvaro J. Name; Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Duke University
摘要：We introduce career concerns into rank-order tournaments and offer a novel explanation for the pervasiveness of multiple prizes. We argue that career-concerned individuals, already facing market pressure to perform, will be reluctant to participate in winner-take-all competitions. To entice them and maximize performance, the organizer promises a softer competition through multiple prizes. We show that the minimum number of prizes is single-peaked in the population's talent variance and increas...
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作者：Lange, Rutger-Jan; Teulings, Coen N.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Utrecht University
摘要：The standard model of irreversible investment under uncertainty considers only the level of the cash flow that could be obtained through the investment. We present a general model that includes as state variables both the level and the growth rate of the cash flow, while the timing and size of the one-time investment are discretionary. As an illustration, we consider an investor with the exclusive right to develop a vacant piece of land, where the timing of the investment and the scale of the ...
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作者：He, Xuedong; Hu, Sang
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
摘要：We consider the problem of finding the best time to stop a diffusion process for an agent with a preference model that is a mixture of expected utility theory (EUT) and cumulative prospect theory (CPT). In view of time-inconsistency, we consider two types of agents: a naive agent, who is not aware of the time-inconsistency and thus re-plans at every instant, and a sophisticated agent, who is aware of the time-inconsistency and takes a so-called intra-personal equilibrium strategy by correctly ...
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作者：Auster, Sarah; Kettering, Jeremy; Kochov, Asen
作者单位：University of Bonn; Alvernia University; University of Rochester
摘要：We consider a dynamic pure exchange economy in which agents have a coarse perception of the future, and awareness emerges gradually over time. We make the key assumption that awareness of a shock to agents' endowments emerges before the shock hits, so agents can adapt by purchasing (or selling) insurance. We provide an irrelevance theorem showing that, under suitable conditions, unawareness matters if and only if it concerns aggregate shocks. In particular, if the unforeseen endowment shocks a...
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作者：Luo, Chenghong; Perez-Castrillo, David; Sun, Chaoran
作者单位：Shanghai University of International Business & Economics; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Shanghai University of International Business & Economics
摘要：We study the assignment game (Shapley and Shubik, 1972) and its generalization of the multiple- partners game (Sotomayor, 1992), the simplest many-to-many extension. Our main result is that the Shapley value of a replicated multiple-partners game converges to a competitive equilibrium payoff when the number of replicas tends to infinity. The result also holds for a large subclass of semivalues since we prove that they converge to the same value as the replica becomes large. Furthermore, in sup...
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作者：Hedlund, Jonas; Hernandez-Chanto, Allan; Oyarzun, Carlos
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of Queensland
摘要：We analyze information disclosure as a policy instrument for contagion management in decentralized environments. A benevolent planner (e.g., the government) tests a fraction of the population to learn the infection rate. Individuals meet randomly and exert vigilance effort. Efforts factor in a passage function to reduce the probability of contagion. We analyze the information disclosure policy that maximizes society's expected welfare. When efforts are substitutes, we provide necessary conditi...
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作者：Anderson, Simon P.; de Palma, Andre
作者单位：University of Virginia; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We link fundamental technological and taste distributions to endogenous economic distributions of prices and firm size (output, profit) generated under monopolistic competition with heterogeneous productivities as per recent Trade and Industrial Organization models. We derive full equivalence properties for monopoly mark-ups, demand shape, marginal revenue, and profits to match distributions of cost, price, output, and profit under monopolistic competition. Demand and one distribution determin...
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作者：Laclau, Marie; Renou, Ludovic; Venel, Xavier
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of London; Queen Mary University London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Luiss Guido Carli University
摘要：We consider sender-receiver games, where the sender and the receiver are two distant nodes in a communication network. We show that if the network has two disjoint paths of communication between the sender and the receiver, then we can replicate all equilibrium outcomes not only of the direct communication game (i.e., when the sender and the receiver communicate directly with each other) but also of the mediated game (i.e., when the sender and the receiver communicate with the help of a mediat...
