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作者：Xiong, Yan; Yang, Liyan
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; University of Toronto
摘要：Big data and data technology have facilitated the widespread adoption of personalized pricing practices. While price personalization enables firms to extract greater rent from consumers, it often reduces price transparency, which can negatively impact firm profits in situations involving consumer coordination. In such contexts, a firm's commitment to pricing strategies can become essential for restoring profitability. We explore several commitment devices available to firms and discuss their i...
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作者：Asseyer, Andreas
作者单位：Free University of Berlin
摘要：This paper studies information orders in screening models. I amend a general screening problem with a signal about the agent's type. The principal prefers one signal to another for any preferences of principal and agent if and only if the signals are ranked by Blackwell's order. Under a standard regularity condition, a novel information order - the hazard rate spread (HRS) order - characterizes a robust ranking of signals by the principal. I relate the HRS order to wellknown information orders...
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作者：Ellis, Andrew
摘要：In many choice problems, the interaction between several distinct variables determines the payoff of each alternative. I propose and axiomatize a model of a decision maker who recognizes that she may not accurately perceive the correlation between these variables, and who takes this into account when making her decision. She chooses as if she calculates each alternative's expected outcome under multiple possible correlation structures, and then evaluates it according to the worst expected outc...
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作者：Bougt, Daniel; Ghosh, Gagan; Liu, Heng
作者单位：Hanken School of Economics; California State University System; California State University Fullerton; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
摘要：We study the effect of ambiguity on expected revenue in multi-unit auctions where bidders have independent private values, maxmin preferences, and single-unit demand. If the set of priors is suitably rich, we show that the discriminatory or 'pay-as-bid' auction has the highest expected revenue, followed by the sequential first-price auction and then the sequential second-price auction. The uniform price auction with the 'highest losing bid' pricing rule does the worst. Our results also extend ...
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作者：Ichihashi, Shota
作者单位：Queens University - Canada
摘要：Agents decide whether to commit a crime based on their private types, which capture their heterogeneous returns from a crime. The police have information about these types. The police search agents, without commitment, to detect crime subject to a search capacity constraint. The deterrent effect of policing is lost when the police have full information about agents' types. The crime-minimizing information structure prevents the police from identifying agents who face high returns from a crime,...
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作者：Guo, Yingni; Hao, Li; Shi, Xianwen
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：A seller of an indivisible good designs a selling mechanism for a buyer whose private information (his type) is the distribution of his value for the good. A selling mechanism includes both a menu of sequential pricing, and a menu of information disclosure about the realized value that the buyer is allowed to learn privately. In a model of two types with an increasing likelihood ratio, we show that under some regularity conditions the disclosure policy in an optimal mechanism has a nested inte...
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作者：Min, Weicheng
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要：This paper examines the impact of a recommender's career concerns on the long-term relationship with a consumer when the recommender has a private type in his expertise. An informed type's expertise is valuable for the consumer's ongoing purchasing decisions, whereas an uninformed type lacks such expertise and thus cannot mimic the informed type. I show that the uninformed type's reputation concerns never benefit the consumer and may lead to a complete market breakdown when they are sufficient...
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作者：Arce, Fernando; Bengui, Julien; Bianchi, Javier
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; Inter-American Development Bank; Swiss National Bank (SNB); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：In this paper, we revisit the scope for macroprudential policy in production economies with cuniary externalities and collateral constraints. We study competitive equilibria and constrained efficient equilibria and examine the extent to which the gap between the two depends on production structure and the policy instruments available to the planner. We argue that macro prudential policy is desirable regardless of whether the competitive equilibrium features more or less borrowing than the cons...
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作者：Burkett, Justin; Woodward, Kyle
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; Apple Inc
摘要：We consider the problem faced by a durable-good monopolist who can allocate a single good at any time, but is uncertain of a buyer's values and temporal preferences for receiving the good. We derive conditions under which it is optimal for the monopolist to ignore the uncertainty about the buyer's discount factor and allocate immediately via a single first-period price. Under one condition, the seller optimally offers a single first-period price if she would weakly raise this price upon learni...
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作者：Gottardi, Piero; Maurin, Vincent; Monnet, Cyril
作者单位：University of Essex; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University of Bern; Study Center Gerzensee
摘要：We study the effect of investment growth on firms' incentives under moral hazard. Adding value- increasing, but risky projects to a firm's portfolio can weaken incentives for safer ones, even when returns are independent. While the firm diversifies its sources of income, this risk contamination channel can increase its fragility. Such fragility is exacerbated in the presence of news about the value of investments. Firms can mitigate these effects by selecting safer new investments at the expen...
