Information orders in screening problems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Asseyer, Andreas
• 署名单位: Free University of Berlin
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105993
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Screening problem; Information order; mechanism design; welfare analysis; price discrimination

摘要

This paper studies information orders in screening models. I amend a general screening problem with a signal about the agent's type. The principal prefers one signal to another for any preferences of principal and agent if and only if the signals are ranked by Blackwell's order. Under a standard regularity condition, a novel information order - the hazard rate spread (HRS) order - characterizes a robust ranking of signals by the principal. I relate the HRS order to wellknown information orders and provide sufficient conditions for other welfare measures than the principal's payoff to increase or decrease in the HRS order.