Revenue effects of ambiguity in multi-unit auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bougt, Daniel; Ghosh, Gagan; Liu, Heng
• 署名单位: Hanken School of Economics; California State University System; California State University Fullerton; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105996
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Multi-unit auctions; ambiguity; revenue

摘要

We study the effect of ambiguity on expected revenue in multi-unit auctions where bidders have independent private values, maxmin preferences, and single-unit demand. If the set of priors is suitably rich, we show that the discriminatory or 'pay-as-bid' auction has the highest expected revenue, followed by the sequential first-price auction and then the sequential second-price auction. The uniform price auction with the 'highest losing bid' pricing rule does the worst. Our results also extend to some open auction formats.