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作者：Guasoni, Paolo; Weber, Marko Hans
作者单位：Dublin City University; University of Bologna; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper examines the implications of unhedgeable fundamental risk, combined with agents' heterogeneous preferences and wealth allocations, on dynamic asset pricing and portfolio choice. We solve in closed form a continuous-time general equilibrium model in which unhedgeable fundamental risk affects aggregate consumption dynamics, rendering the market incomplete. Several long-lived agents with heterogeneous risk-aversion and time-preference make consumption and investment decisions, trading ...
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作者：Duffy, John; Lebeau, Lucie; Puzzello, Daniela
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of Osaka; Wellesley College; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：Bargaining is widely used in monetary, labor and finance models to determine terms of trade. The chosen bargaining solution can matter for welfare analysis, for example when agents are liquidity constrained. Here we report on an experiment in which buyers and sellers engage in semi-structured bargaining to determine the terms of trade with the aim of evaluating the empirical relevance of two bargaining solutions, the generalized Nash bargaining solution and Kalai's proportional bargaining solu...
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作者：Savochkin, Andrei; Shklyaev, Alexander; Galatenko, Alexey
作者单位：Bocconi University; Lomonosov Moscow State University
摘要：We study the Smooth Ambiguity decision criterion in the dynamic setting to understand when it can satisfy the Dynamic Consistency and Consequentialism properties. These properties allow one to rewrite the decision criterion recursively and solve for optimal decisions by Dynamic Programming. Our result characterizes the possibility of having these properties through a condition that resembles Epstein and Schneider's (2003) rectangularity condition for the maxmin model. At the same time, we show...
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作者：Ritzberger, Klaus; Weibull, Jorgen W.; Wikman, Peter
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Stockholm School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：A new solution concept for finite games is presented and analyzed. It is defined in terms of outcomes-probability distributions over the plays of the game. Solid outcomes are robust to the representation of the game, whether in normal or extensive form, and are consistent with backward induction. They are also unaffected by the removal or addition of dominated strategies. Solid outcome sets exist in all finite extensive-form games with perfect recall. They have support in minimal game blocks, ...
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作者：Sabarwal, Tarun
作者单位：University of Kansas
摘要：We provide a new and general theory of order nearest comparative statics for subsets of equilibria in models with complementarities used widely in economics and other disciplines. Order nearest equilibria are motivated naturally in the theory of monotone comparative statics of equilibrium, but their existence does not follow from results based on weak set order or strong set order, in general. We provide such results and develop the general theory using weak monotonicity of selections from bes...
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作者：Fiaschi, Davide; Ricci, Cristiano
作者单位：University of Pisa
摘要：This paper examines the spatial agglomeration of workers and income in a continuous spacetime framework. Local markets feature spatial spillovers and both exogenous and endogenous amenities. Workers relocate to maximise their instantaneous utility, constrained by mobility costs. In the limit of infinite workers, short-run equilibria are described by a partial differential equation (PDE). The PDE reveals spatial dynamics influenced by initial conditions, path dependence, and metastability (pers...
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作者：Billot, Antoine; Qu, Xiangyu
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Wuhan University of Technology
摘要：We study social intertemporal preferences constructed through the aggregation of individual preferences that differ in both time discounting and instantaneous utility. We introduce weakened forms of the Pareto condition under which the social discount and instantaneous utility functions are weighted averages of their individual counterparts. We show that if individuals are time-consistent, then society can only preserve this property without falling into dictatorship by applying the condition ...
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作者：Bervoets, Sebastian; Makihara, Kohmei
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We consider public goods games with heterogeneous players interacting on a network and investigate how shocks to players' characteristics and changes in interaction patterns influence individual and total contributions. We introduce a linear system associated to the initial game, in which heterogeneity in players' characteristics is removed and interactions between players are reversed, and show that what matters in determining the effects of a shock on contributions is the sign of the coordin...
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作者：Cheung, Paul H. Y.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：We propose and characterize the General Reciprocity Model in a framework of context-dependent choice. In the model, the second mover can establish their own rules regarding when or why to reciprocate. The model disentangles the baseline social preference from reciprocity: reciprocity occurs when people deviate from their baseline preference due to the context in which the first mover's choice is made. Our model provides a condition to reveal reciprocity, which aligns with the standard model-fr...
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作者：Kostadinov, Rumen; Roldan, Francisco
作者单位：McMaster University; International Monetary Fund
摘要：We study the optimal design of inflation targets by a planner who lacks commitment and exerts imperfect control over inflation. By comparing realized inflation to the targets, the public forms beliefs about the government's commitment. Such reputation is valuable as it helps curb inflation expectations. However, plans that are more tempting to break lead to faster reputational losses in the ensuing equilibrium. The planner's optimal announcement balances low inflation promises with incentives ...
