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作者：Gao, Pingyang; Jiang, Xu; Lu, Jinzhi
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; Duke University; City University of Hong Kong
摘要：Short selling regulation has been a longstanding topic of debate in financial markets, particularly during times of crisis. While proponents argue that short selling aids in price discovery and market efficiency, critics raise concerns about manipulative short selling practices that can destabilize markets. This paper presents a theoretical model to analyze the impact of short selling, specifically manipulative short selling (MSS), on bank runs and efficiency. The model demonstrates that MSS c...
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作者：Perea, Andres
作者单位：Maastricht University; Maastricht University
摘要：Within dynamic games we are interested in conditions on the players' preferences that imply dynamic consistency and the existence of sequentially optimal strategies. The latter means that the strategy is optimal at each of the player's information sets, given his beliefs there. To explore these properties we assume, following Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003) and Perea (2025a), that every player holds a conditional preference relation-a mapping that assigns to every probabilistic belief about the o...
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作者：Gieczewski, German
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：This paper models a war of attrition that evolves over time. Two players fight over a prize until one surrenders. The flow costs of fighting depend on a state variable that is public but changes stochastically as the war unfolds. In the unique equilibrium, each player surrenders when the state becomes adverse enough; for intermediate states, both players fight on. In an extension, the baseline model is augmented to allow for unilateral concessions of part of the prize. Such concessions can be ...
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作者：Levine, David K.
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：I analyze a social evolutionary model in which there is a non-excludable public good that reduces the chances of catastrophe. I show that while resilient types that produce the public good cannot survive head-to-head competition with other more selfish types in a fixed population, they do if catastrophes reduce population.
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作者：Farboodi, Maryam; Jarosch, Gregor; Menzio, Guido; Wiriadinata, Ursula
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Duke University; New York University; International Monetary Fund
摘要：This paper shows that intermediation in asset markets may emerge exclusively because of rent extraction motives. Among dealers with heterogeneous bargaining skills, those with superior skills become intermediaries and constitute the core of the trading network, while those with inferior skills constitute the periphery. Intermediation is privately profitable because agents with superior bargaining skills can take positions and unwind them in the future at a better price than others could. Inter...
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作者：Chang, Dongkyu; Vong, Allen
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; National University of Singapore
摘要：We study a coordination game played by a large number of agents, who acquire private signals about a hidden state on a platform before choosing individual actions. The platform privately and imperfectly filters misinformation, improving the precision of these signals. We show that a platform with an ethical concern to proactively improve agents' welfare could perversely reduce their welfare by aggravating their disagreements about the state and in turn undermining coordination. We also show th...
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作者：Bhattacharya, Debopam
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：McFadden's random-utility model of multinomial choice has long been the workhorse of applied research. We establish shape-restrictions with respect to price and income which are necessary and sufficient for multinomial choice-probability functions to be rationalized via random-utility models with additive but nonparametric unobserved heterogeneity and general income-effects. Our proof is constructive, and facilitates nonparametric identification of preference-distributions without requiring id...
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作者：Gopalakrishna, Goutham; Lee, Seung Joo; Papamichalis, Theofanis
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Oxford; University of Cambridge
摘要：We develop a tractable framework to explore how beliefs about long-term economic growth shape macroeconomic and financial stability. By modeling belief distortions among productive capital users, we provide an analytical characterization of a novel phenomenon termed the net worth trap, wherein overly optimistic or pessimistic beliefs among productive agents prevent them from rebuilding wealth, causing permanent inefficiencies. A procyclical swing in beliefs reduces or exacerbates the instabili...
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作者：Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; Wolthoff, Ronald
作者单位：Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School (PKU Shenzhen); Peking University; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; University of Toronto
摘要：This paper considers a random search model where some locations provide sellers with better chances of meeting many buyers than other locations (for example popular shopping streets or the first page of a search engine). When sellers are heterogeneous in terms of the quality of their product and/or the probability that a given buyer likes their product, it is desirable that sellers of high-quality niche products sort into the best locations (positive assortative matching, PAM). We show that th...
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作者：Bhardwaj, Bhavook; Manocha, Kriti
作者单位：Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要：This paper introduces a model of decision making based on a procedure of rejection. Departing from the standard model of choice via preference maximization, the decision maker (DM) in our model rejects minimal alternatives from a menu according to a binary relation. We axiomatically study the correspondence of non-rejected alternatives with different rationality conditions on the underlying binary relation. We then generalize our model to study correspondences generated by an iterative procedu...
