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作者：Abad, Nicolas; Etner, Johanna; Raffin, Natacha; Seegmuller, Thomas
作者单位：Universite de Rouen Normandie; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Paris Saclay; Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We use an overlapping generations model with physical and human capital, and two reproductive periods to explore how fertility decisions may differ in response to economic incentives in early and late adulthood. In particular, we analyze the interplay between fertility choices-related to career opportunities-and wages, and investigate the role played by work experience and investment in both types of capital. We show that young adults postpone parenthood above a certain wage threshold and that...
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作者：Mishra, Debasis; Patil, Sanket
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Bangalore
摘要：We study undominated mechanisms with transfers for regulating a monopolist who privately observes the marginal cost of production. A mechanism is undominated if no other mechanism gives the regulator a strictly higher payoff at some marginal cost of the monopolist without lowering the regulator's payoff at other costs. We show that an undominated mechanism has a quantity floor: whenever the monopolist is allowed to operate, it produces above a threshold quantity. Moreover, the regulator's oper...
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作者：Dube, Jean-Pierre; Joo, Joonhwi; Kim, Kyeongbae
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Sejong University
摘要：We establish the integrability of demand for a broad class of discrete/continuous choice, additive, homothetic random-utility models of individual consumer behavior with perfect substitutes preferences (linear indifference curves) and divisible goods. We derive the corresponding indirect utility function and then establish a representative consumer formulation for this entire class of models. The representative consumer is always normative, facilitating aggregate welfare analysis. These findin...
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作者：Kasberger, Bernhard; Woodward, Kyle
作者单位：University of Konstanz
摘要：Multi-unit auctions frequently take place in environments with limited information, such as in new markets and under volatile macroeconomic conditions. We characterize optimal prior-free bids in such auctions; these bids minimize the maximal loss in expected utility resulting from uncertainty surrounding opponent behavior. We show that optimal bids are readily computable in this environment despite bidders having multi-dimensional private information. In the pay-as-bid auction the prior-free b...
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作者：Barbieri, Stefano; Topolyan, Iryna
作者单位：Tulane University; University System of Ohio; University of Cincinnati
摘要：We consider group all-pay auctions with a wide range of effort complementarity in which teammates coordinate efforts via a group-specific correlation device. Under mild regularity conditions, there is a unique equilibrium effort distribution, independent of the distribution correlation device. We characterize this unique distribution of efforts and analyze the effects value dispersion, degree of complementarity, and group size. We show that this effort distribution can be achieved without corr...
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作者：Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位：Northwestern University; Northwestern University
摘要：I consider a class of strategic interactions under asymmetric information in which, prior to finalizing their actions (consumption, production, or investment decisions), agents choose the attention to allocate to a large number of information sources about exogenous events that are responsible for their payoffs (the underlying fundamentals). I study what type of payoff interdependencies contribute to inefficiency in the allocation of attention. I then compare the results for the benchmark of p...
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作者：Aberg, Simon Essig; Baisa, Brian
作者单位：Harvard University; Amherst College
摘要：We study multi-unit auctions for homogeneous goods in a private-value setting where bidders have multi-unit demand and non-negative wealth effects. When bidders have quasilinear preferences, the Vickrey auction implements an efficient outcome in dominant strategies. When bidders have positive wealth effects, recent impossibility results find that no auction implements an efficient outcome. We quantify the worst-case inefficiency of the Vickrey auction and other multi-unit auctions when bidders...
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作者：Koessler, Frederic; Pahlke, Marieke
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Corvinus University Budapest
摘要：We use a notion of maxmin self-confirming equilibrium (MSCE) to study the design of players' information feedback about others' behavior in simultaneous-move games with ambiguity- averse players. Coarse feedback shapes strategic uncertainty and can, therefore, modify players' equilibrium strategies in an advantageous way. We characterize MSCE and study the equilibrium implications of coarse feedback in various classes of games. We show how feedback should be optimally designed to improve contr...
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作者：Kim, Jin Yeub; Lee, Jong Jae
作者单位：Yonsei University; Catholic University of Korea
摘要：This paper presents a theory of mediator selection in conflicts that compares biased and unbiased mediation. We characterize optimal mechanisms used by biased mediators when they are selected into mediation, and determine when and how parties in dispute accept a biased mediator in equilibrium. We find that when asymmetric information is significant, parties accept biased mediation as long as the degree of mediator bias is not too strong. Biased mediators care more about the payoffs of their fa...
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作者：Kim, Eungsik; Spear, Stephen
作者单位：University of Kansas; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This paper studies the impact of imperfect competition on life-cycle consumption profiles and consumption-risk sharing, along with its policy implications. We develop a framework by incorporating the Shapley-Shubik market game into a stochastic overlapping generations model. We characterize the inverse income-marginal price relationship under market power, where wealthy agents face lower prices for identical goods compared to a perfectly competitive economy. We present several novel findings d...
