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作者：Cetin, Umut
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper addresses the question of how insiders internalize the additional penalties to trade in a continuous time Kyle model. The penalties can be interpreted as non-adverse selection transaction costs or legal penalties due to illegal insider trading. The equilibrium is established for general asset distribution. In equilibrium, the insider does not disseminate her private information fully into the market prices. Moreover, she always trades a constant multiple of the discrepancy between h...
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作者：McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Standard mechanism design begins with a statement of the problem, including knowledge on the designer's part about the distribution of the characteristics (preferences and information) of the participants who are to engage with the mechanism. There is a large literature on robust mechanism design, much of which aims to reduce the assumed information the designer has about the participants. In this paper we provide an auction mechanism for interdependent value problems that performs well when t...
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作者：Chang, Hung-Chi; Li, Yiting
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; National Taiwan University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; National Taiwan University
摘要：This paper revisits Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) (GSW) to study screening in a competitive search market with adverse selection. GSW show that there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which each type applies to a different contract, and their key sorting assumption involves a single-crossing property on agents' preferences. We show that GSW's main results hold under a weaker assumption on preference heterogeneity, called generalized sorting, and weakening the sorting assumption ...
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作者：Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Mihm, Maximilian
作者单位：Lancaster University; New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi
摘要：The Luce Choice Rule (or, equivalently, the multinomial logit model) is extensively used in economics and other fields. Classical characterizations rest on Luce's Choice Axiom, when all choice sets are available, and Luce's Product Rule in the case of binary choice. Yet, actual datasets typically consist neither of all choice sets nor all binary choice sets. We provide a characterization for the general case, allowing also for zero choice probabilities. Building upon this characterization, we ...
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作者：Hiller, Timo
摘要：This paper studies optimal targeting policies, which consist of eliminating (preserving) a set of agents in a network and aim to minimize (maximize) aggregate effort levels. Unlike the existing literature, we allow the equilibrium network to adapt after a network intervention. We introduce a novel and tractable adjustment process. If global strategic substitution effects are sufficiently small, optimal targeting is characterized by a simple rule: eliminate a set of agents with the highest degr...
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作者：Imamura, Kenzo
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：A college or firm makes admissions or hiring decisions for which each candidate is characterized by priority ranking and type, which might depend on race, gender, or socioeconomic status. The admissions or hiring committee faces a tradeoff between meritocracy and diversity: Although a merit-irst choice rule might admit candidates of the same type, a diversity-irst choice rule might be unfair because of priority violations. To formalize this tradeoff, we introduce a measure of meritocracy and a...
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作者：Strzalecki, Tomasz; Toikka, Juuso
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Pennsylvania
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作者：Pourbabaee, Farzad; Echenique, Federico
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We study mechanism design for public-good provision under a noisy privacy-preserving transformation of individual agents' reported preferences. The setting is a standard binary model with transfers and quasi-linear utility. Agents report their preferences for the public good, which are randomly flipped, so that any individual report may be explained away as the outcome of noise. We study the tradeoffs between preserving the public decisions made in the presence of noise (noise sensitivity), pu...
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作者：Xu, Wenji
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper studies a sequential social learning model in which agents learn about an underlying state from others' actions. Unlike classic models, we consider a setting where agents may observe coarse signals of past actions. We identify a simple, necessary, and sufficient condition for asymptotic learning, called separability, which depends on both the information environment and the payoff structure. A necessary condition for separability is unbounded beliefs which requires agents' private i...
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作者：He, Kevin; Libgober, Jonathan
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Southern California
摘要：We extend the indirect evolutionary approach to the selection of (possibly misspecified) models. Agents with different models match in pairs to play a stage game, where models define feasible beliefs about game parameters and about others' strategies. In equilibrium, each agent adopts the feasible belief that best fits their data and plays optimally given their beliefs. We define the stability of the resident model by comparing its equilibrium payoff with that of the entrant model, and provide...
