Overborrowing, underborrowing, and macroprudential policy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Arce, Fernando; Bengui, Julien; Bianchi, Javier
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; Inter-American Development Bank; Swiss National Bank (SNB); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106019
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Macroprudential policy; overborrowing; Under-borrowing

摘要

In this paper, we revisit the scope for macroprudential policy in production economies with cuniary externalities and collateral constraints. We study competitive equilibria and constrained efficient equilibria and examine the extent to which the gap between the two depends on production structure and the policy instruments available to the planner. We argue that macro prudential policy is desirable regardless of whether the competitive equilibrium features more or less borrowing than the constrained-efficient equilibrium. In our quantitative analysis, macro prudential taxes on borrowing turn out to be larger when the government has access to ex-post stabilization policies.