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作者：BILODEAU, M
摘要：The performance of tax-earmarking institutions that require individuals to contribute some minimum levels toward public goods but do not constrain the composition of their contributions is examined. It is shown that in a non-negligible class of circumstances, leaving the spending decisions in the hands of individuals would yield a unique non-cooperative equilibrium in the (constrained) core. These results are then applied to the analysis of financing rules for public and separate schools in Ca...
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作者：BROWNING, EK
摘要：This paper argues that there are a large number of non-tax phenomena that have the effect of reducing input prices below marginal value products, just as do taxes on income. It is shown that the presence of the 'non-tax wedge' between the marginal value product of labor and the net wage is highly significant for the analysis of the total and marginal welfare costs of taxes. (Similarly, the presence of the tax wedge is significant for the analysis of the welfare effects of the non-tax phenomena...
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作者：DEMOUGIN, D; SINN, HW
作者单位：University of Munich; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper studies alternative methods of privatizing a formerly communist firm in the presence of imperfect risk markets. The methods include cash sales, a give-away scheme, and a participation contract where the government retains a sleeping fractional ownership in the firm. It is shown that, with competitive bidding, the participation contract dominates cash sales because it generates both more private restructuring investment and a higher expected present value of revenue for the governmen...
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作者：PUDNEY, S; SUTHERLAND, H
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Leicester; University of Cambridge
摘要：We assess the statistical reliability of microsimulation models in two ways: by comparing simulated outcomes with survey 'actuals'; and by calculating asymptotic confidence intervals for a variety of summary measures. The confidence intervals we derive take account of re-weighting for differential survey response, and also the effects of imposing revenue-neutrality. They are calculated for a version of one of the most widely-used U.K. tax-benefit simulation models. The results suggest that bas...
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作者：BOADWAY, R; MARCHAND, M; PESTIEAU, P
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; University of Liege
摘要：Despite the fact that all developed economies levy broadly based indirect taxes alongside direct taxes, little theory is devoted to explaining the direct-indirect tax mix. Our purpose is to show that if different taxes have different evasion characteristics, some optimal tax mix emerges naturally. Assuming that only income tax can be evaded and focusing on a two-class economy, we analyse the case for supplementing optimal (non-linear) income taxation with commodity taxation, and we develop con...
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作者：COATE, S; JOHNSON, S; ZECKHAUSER, R
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：The pecuniary effects of cash and in-kind programs differ. A program that builds housing for the poor, for example, is likely to result in a lower price of existing low-income housing than would an equally costly cash transfer program. Low-income renters in general would benefit; landlords would lose. This paper argues that these pecuniary effects provide a previously unstudied rationale for the use of in-kind programs. Specifically, in a world in which the government has limited ability to ta...
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作者：HELSLEY, RW; OSULLIVAN, A
作者单位：Oregon State University
摘要：An altrusitic citizen votes 'yes' in a referendum if the perceived benefit of the project exceeds its perceived cost. The altruist gets information about benefits and costs from contributions to the 'pro' and 'con' campaigns. In the Nash equilibrium of a campaign-contribution game with two beneficiaries, altruists vote on the side with the largest contribution, and altruistic voting guarantees efficient choices. If there are many agents, however, altruistic voters do not always make efficient ...
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作者：CHAUDHURI, S; RAVALLION, M
作者单位：The World Bank; Princeton University
摘要：We investigate how well the most widely used static welfare indicators perform in identifying the chronically poor. We propose a normative measure of performance: the cost of a given impact on chronic poverty when transfers are contingent, upon a purely static indicator. Using longitudinal household data from rural India, we find that current consumption is not always a better indicator of chronic poverty than current income. Both, however, perform much better than other common indicators, suc...
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作者：CLAY, K
摘要：Although marginal cost pricing is necessary for welfare maximization, firms that produce under conditions of decreasing average cost incur losses if they price at marginal cost. In this paper, the Coase two-part tariff is extended to several cases of common costs by assessing surplus in order to recover the losses of the regulated natural monopolist; the existence of equilibria in these cases is demonstrated. Three models are considered in the context of an Arrow-Debreu private ownership econo...
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作者：BOVENBERG, AL; VANDERPLOEG, F
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Tilburg University; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
摘要：Environmental and tax policies and the optimal provision of clean and dirty public goods are analysed within the context of a second-best framework of optimal taxation. Households consume both clean and dirty commodities. Degradation of the natural environment occurs due to the consumption of dirty private and public goods, but can be offset when the government engages in abatement activities. Increased environmental concern implies a higher dirt tax, a lower tax on labour, less employment, mo...
