ALTRUISTIC VOTING AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
HELSLEY, RW; OSULLIVAN, A
署名单位：
Oregon State University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(94)90083-3
发表日期：
1994
页码：
107-119
关键词：
摘要：
An altrusitic citizen votes 'yes' in a referendum if the perceived benefit of the project exceeds its perceived cost. The altruist gets information about benefits and costs from contributions to the 'pro' and 'con' campaigns. In the Nash equilibrium of a campaign-contribution game with two beneficiaries, altruists vote on the side with the largest contribution, and altruistic voting guarantees efficient choices. If there are many agents, however, altruistic voters do not always make efficient choices. A disclosure law that provides information about the number of beneficiaries increases the efficiency of the referedum process.
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