A COASEAN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM-MODEL OF REGULATION
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
CLAY, K
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(94)90035-3
发表日期：
1994
页码：
459-475
关键词：
摘要：
Although marginal cost pricing is necessary for welfare maximization, firms that produce under conditions of decreasing average cost incur losses if they price at marginal cost. In this paper, the Coase two-part tariff is extended to several cases of common costs by assessing surplus in order to recover the losses of the regulated natural monopolist; the existence of equilibria in these cases is demonstrated. Three models are considered in the context of an Arrow-Debreu private ownership economy: a model of the regulated monopolist who charges hookups to both households and firms who use the good: a model of the regulated natural monopolist who is allowed to make positive economic profit; and finally a model where two or more monopolists are under the control of a single regulator.
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