TAX-EARMARKING AND SEPARATE SCHOOL FINANCING
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
BILODEAU, M
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(94)90070-1
发表日期：
1994
页码：
51-63
关键词：
摘要：
The performance of tax-earmarking institutions that require individuals to contribute some minimum levels toward public goods but do not constrain the composition of their contributions is examined. It is shown that in a non-negligible class of circumstances, leaving the spending decisions in the hands of individuals would yield a unique non-cooperative equilibrium in the (constrained) core. These results are then applied to the analysis of financing rules for public and separate schools in Canada.
来源URL：