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作者：HINES, JR
摘要：Many governments tax the foreign income of their firms, using a system that grants credits for foreign taxes paid and permits tax deferral for unrepatriated income. This paper shows that such tax systems encourage firms to restrict their equity stakes in new foreign investments, and to finance their new investments with considerable debt. These incentives exist even when transfer price regulation effectively limits the profit rates foreign subsidiaries can earn. The behavior of the foreign sub...
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作者：CORNES, R; SANDLER, T
作者单位：Iowa State University; Australian National University
摘要：This paper explores the comparative static properties of the impure public good model, in which a privately acquired activity jointly produces a public and a private good. The comparative statics are expressed in terms of familiar income and Hicks-compensated price responses. Unlike the pure public good model, the impure public model can display positively sloped reaction curves even in the absence of income effects. Comparative statics involve changes in price, or income, or the contributions...
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作者：KUEHLWEIN, M
摘要：Before 1976, the affluent transferred most of their wealth to their heirs through bequests, not gifts even though gifts faced lower statutory tax rates. This suggests the affluent were not acting altruistically. However, bequests had the advantage that unrealized capital gains were forgiven at the moment of transfer. Taking this into account, I derive true marginal gift and estate tax rates. Contrary to previous research, I find that the affluent failed to equalize these true rates, both befor...
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作者：TURNOVSKY, SJ; OKUYAMA, T
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：It is sometimes argued that the favorable tax treatment afforded to housing may lead to an oversupply of housing at the expense of capital. This issue is examined in the context of a growing two-sector economy. In the basic model where the rate of time preference is constant and labor is instantaneously sectorally mobile, the long-run response of the capital stock to a tax on housing depends upon the relative capital intensities of the two sectors, while the long-run relative asset price of ho...
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作者：KANNIAINEN, V; SODERSTEN, J
作者单位：Uppsala University; University of Helsinki
摘要：A new approach to understanding the real effects of corporate taxation is suggested. Essentially, by claiming that corporate debt means discipline for the executives, the debt policy of a firm is endogenised. It is then proved that the effective profits tax rate is tied to current and expected future profitability, reflected in the marginal valuation of equity. A theoretically correct effective marginal profits tax rate cannot be estimated from historical figures. Moreover, a new tax neutralit...
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作者：MILESIFERRETTI, GM; SPOLAORE, E
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：When parties with different preferences compete for election, strategic manipulation of state variables for electoral purposes can occur even with rational voters. This paper presents a model in which government resources can be used 'productively', for the benefit of everybody, or 'unproductively', for the benefit of the ruling party's constituency. A government more inclined to unproductive spending may choose to collect public resources inefficiently in order to reduce the importance of spe...
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作者：TRANDEL, GA
摘要：This paper considers the manner in which an unequal distribution of consumers affects the commodity tax policies of neighboring jurisdictions. The paper uses a spatial model in which the residents of two states are distributed non-uniformly and employs a variety of assumptions about the behavior of governments and firms. Throughout, the paper shows that, at a Nash equilibrium in tax levels, the sparsely-populated state imposes a lower tax than does its densely-populated neighbor. The paper als...
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作者：VARIAN, HR
摘要：I examine games involving private contributions to a public good and show that less of the public good will be supplied if agents move sequentially than if they move simultaneously. If the agents bid for the right to move first, the agent who values the public good least will win. If each agent chooses the rate at which he will subsidize the other agent's contributions, the subsidies that support the Lindahl allocation are the unique equilibrium outcome. I also describe two related subsidy-set...
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作者：SMITH, E
摘要：This paper analyzes the effects of wage and profit taxation in a simple search and bargaining model. Wage tax effects depend upon the level of unemployment benefits. If unemployment benefits are less than search costs or if benefits are taxed as income, then a wage tax decreases unemployment. It also decreases the wage, thereby overshifting the tax burden. Profit tax effects depend upon job entry. In the short run with a fixed number of jobs (filled jobs plus vacancies), a profit tax decreases...
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作者：DINWIDDY, C; TEAL, F
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：This paper investigates the relationship between recent theoretical work on the shadow wage rate in a tax-distorted economy and the border-price equivalent methods, recommended by Little and Mirrlees and widely used in project appraisal manuals and empirical applications.
