ENVIRONMENTAL-POLICY, PUBLIC-FINANCE AND THE LABOR-MARKET IN A 2ND-BEST WORLD

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: BOVENBERG, AL; VANDERPLOEG, F
• 署名单位: University of Amsterdam; Tilburg University; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(93)01398-T
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 349-390
• 关键词: environmental externalities; CLEAN AND DIRTY GOODS; DIRT TAX; labor tax; Excess burden; public goods; optimal taxation; Double dividend; 2ND BEST

摘要

Environmental and tax policies and the optimal provision of clean and dirty public goods are analysed within the context of a second-best framework of optimal taxation. Households consume both clean and dirty commodities. Degradation of the natural environment occurs due to the consumption of dirty private and public goods, but can be offset when the government engages in abatement activities. Increased environmental concern implies a higher dirt tax, a lower tax on labour, less employment, more public abatement, and a cleaner environment. If the elasticity of substitution between private consumption commodities and leisure is large and that between clean and dirty goods is small, public consumption may expand while private consumption contracts. Otherwise, public consumption falls.