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作者：Correia, IH
作者单位：Universidade Catolica Portuguesa
摘要：This paper provides a new economic interpretation of the well-known dynamic optimal taxation principle that capital income should not be taxed in the steady state. We show that the result is related to the minimization of distortions at the intratemporal margin. When every factor of production can be taxed at the optimal rate, capital income should not be taxed in the steady state. But when there are restrictions on the taxation of production factors, the tax rate on capital income in the stea...
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作者：Richter, WF; Wellisch, D
作者单位：Technische Universitat Dresden; Dortmund University of Technology
摘要：This paper studies the efficiency properties of allocations when firms and households are mobile and when local governments provide local public goods and local public factors. The analysis differentiates between immobile land owners and perfectly mobile workers and concludes that an efficient allocation is obtained if there is no outflow of land rents to absentee owners. If rents flow out, only local public goods are supplied in accordance with the Samuelson Rule. The provision of local publi...
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作者：HoltzEakin, D; Lovely, ME
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Proponents of industrial policy argue that key industries merit subsidies because they generate beneficial externalities. We show that policy must reflect both technological linkages and market power in the target industries, the interaction of which may produce an optimal policy including both subsidies and taxes on target industries. The optimal policy combination may not be politically or administratively feasible. If so, we show that it may not be desirable to subsidize output in the exter...
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作者：Mohtadi, H
摘要：A simple dynamic representative agent model is presented in which the environment enters into the utility and production functions to analyze long-run economic growth under optimal policy designs. The policies that are considered are production taxes or subsidies and quantitative restrictions. Optimal levels of these instruments are designed by a regulator such that (a) the equilibrium growth path mimics the efficient growth path, and (b) the latter is maximized. One finding is that a combinat...
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作者：Turnovsky, SJ
摘要：This paper employs an endogenous growth model to analyze the role of a consumption tax in enhancing growth and welfare. Provided government expenditure impacts directly on the decisions of private agents, two fiscal instruments are necessary to replicate the first best optimum. The tradeoff between consumption and income taxes to achieve this outcome is discussed and shown to depend upon the degree of congestion associated with the public good and the level of government expenditure relative t...
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作者：Conley, JP; Diamantaras, D
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We give intuitive Samuelson conditions for a very general class of economies. Smoothness and monotonicity are not required. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for all Pareto-efficient allocations, including those on the boundary. We prove that if all agents have a cheaper point, the supporting prices fully decentralize the allocation. We also show first and second welfare theorems as corollaries to the characterization of efficient allocations.
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作者：Heywood, JS; Pal, D
作者单位：University System of Ohio; University of Cincinnati
摘要：This paper models the interaction of a government that maximizes tax revenue and a spatial monopolist that maximizes profit. The government has two tax instruments, a per unit output tax and a transport tax, and the monopolist can strategically alter its location and the mode of transport. If allowed only one tax instrument, then the government chooses the output tax, which generates inefficient strategic choices by the monopolist in order to avoid profit losses. Since the inefficiency is grea...
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作者：Fraser, CD
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：Self-selecting households consume an excludable public good via enabling expenditures-e.g. on TVs and licence fees for broadcasting. We characterise voluntary consumers at an arbitrary all-or-nothing price, and the optimal price a revenue-constrained welfare-maximiser facing voluntary consumers chooses. These are compared with those from universal provision of the public good via a uniform tax. We show that, inter alia, demand for the good might increase with price; self-selection will produce...
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作者：Kofman, F; Lawarree, J
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：We examine a hierarchy formed by a principal, a supervisor and an agent, wherein the supervisor and the agent can collude. We consider a case where collusion-free supervisors are not available. We demonstrate first that it is easy for the principal to deter collusion by introducing a second supervisor and designing a mechanism similar to the prisoner's dilemma so that the two supervisors control each other. Since it could prove too costly for the principal to send two supervisors, a new questi...
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作者：Campbell, DE; Kelly, JS
作者单位：Syracuse University
摘要：We investigate Arrow's problem for the space of allocations of public goods and the domain of profiles of Euclidean individual preferences. We allow some efficiency to be sacrificed in order to avoid dictatorship, but if independence of irrelevant alternatives and transitivity of social preference remain in force, then there is no social welfare function that permits a significant departure from dictatorship without a substantial sacrifice of efficiency.
