Environment, growth, and optimal policy design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mohtadi, H
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(95)01562-0
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 119-140
• 关键词: environment; endogenous growth; regulation

摘要

A simple dynamic representative agent model is presented in which the environment enters into the utility and production functions to analyze long-run economic growth under optimal policy designs. The policies that are considered are production taxes or subsidies and quantitative restrictions. Optimal levels of these instruments are designed by a regulator such that (a) the equilibrium growth path mimics the efficient growth path, and (b) the latter is maximized. One finding is that a combination of quantity controls and optimal tax (subsidy) schemes leads to a higher level of social welfare than an optimal tax (subsidy) scheme alone.