Technological linkages, market structure, and production policies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: HoltzEakin, D; Lovely, ME
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(95)01548-5
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 73-86
• 关键词: industrial policy; production externalities; subsidies

摘要

Proponents of industrial policy argue that key industries merit subsidies because they generate beneficial externalities. We show that policy must reflect both technological linkages and market power in the target industries, the interaction of which may produce an optimal policy including both subsidies and taxes on target industries. The optimal policy combination may not be politically or administratively feasible. If so, we show that it may not be desirable to subsidize output in the externality-generating activity on either a fixed or per-unit basis. Thus, technological linkages alone do not lead to the presumption that the externality-generating activity should be subsidized.