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作者：Chambers, RG; Quiggin, J
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：This paper considers a multi-task, principal-agent problem where risk-averse farmers possessing private information have two tasks, pollution control and corn production, but only direct incentive for corn production. Using a highly tractable reformulation of the standard uncertain production model, a general method for solving the associated constrained Paretian problem is developed and analyzed. The optimal solution is shown to obey a generalized inverse-elasticity rule, and the optimal solu...
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作者：Bond, EW; Gresik, TA
摘要：When a government agency imposes cost-based taxes/regulations on a multinational with private cost information, it may initiate countervailing regulations by another of the governments with which the multinational interacts. We analyze the problem of optimal regulation of a multinational under incomplete cost information (via trade taxes) by multiple governments as a problem of common agency with adverse selection. By focusing on the game played by the competing governments we characterize the...
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作者：Gottschalk, P
摘要：This paper asks whether the observed correlation in welfare participation across generations reflects causal links or unobservables that are correlated across generations. If the correlation is spurious then reducing one generations' welfare participation will have no effect on the next generation. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics is used to estimate two types of models that explicitly take account of correlated unobservables. These models indicate that correlated unobservables are important...
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作者：Haaparanta, P
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper models international competition for foreign direct investment as a common agency problem using the theory of menu auctions developed by Bernheim and Whinston. In the model, national governments act as principals and a multinational corporation as the single agent. Governments are assumed to maximize the net wage income generated by the corporation's investment. It is shown that in the equilibrium of this game a high wage country may be able to attract investment even though all cou...
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作者：Atkinson, AB; Stern, NH
作者单位：European Bank of Reconstructon & Development
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作者：Auten, G; Joulfaian, D
作者单位：United States Department of the Treasury
摘要：This paper investigates the effects of bequest taxes and the income of children on the lifetime charitable contributions of parents. Using matched income tax records for parents and children, the results show a positive elasticity of 0.6 for contributions with respect to the tax price of bequests. The paper also finds that the income of children affects the amount that parents contribute to charity. The results show a positive elasticity of up to 0.14 for contributions by parents with respect ...
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作者：Nava, M; Schroyen, F; Marchand, M
作者单位：University of Antwerp; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：The paper deals with optimal taxation and the provision of public goods in a two-class economy with non-linear income and linear commodity taxes. As far as optimal taxation is concerned, we first show that with two private goods the good complementary with leisure should be taxed more heavily. Secondly, the standard income tax rules are shown to be augmented by considerations for offsetting the distortions created on the commodity markets. As to the provision of public goods we extend recent r...
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作者：Dillen, M; Lundholm, M
摘要：In this paper we extend the classic optimum linear income tax model to a twice repeated game. A utilitarian policy-maker decides on the second-period tax system on the basis of observed first-period behaviour. We summarise our findings as follows. First, the static optimal linear tax results cannot be expected to hold in a dynamic setting. Second, more productive households are likely to mimic the behaviour of less productive households. Third, the optimal dynamic first-period tax rate might b...
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作者：Hoel, M
摘要：If some, but not all, countries are cooperating to reduce CO2 emissions, one could make the following argument: a high carbon tax for carbon intensive tradeable sectors in the cooperating countries will reduce the production of goods from these sectors, and therefore CO2 emissions, in the cooperating countries. However, this will to a large extent be counteracted by increased production of such goods in the countries that have no climate policy. And since it is only total CO2 emissions from al...
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作者：Andersen, TM; Rasmussen, BS; Sorensen, JR
摘要：We set up a general equilibrium model with unemployment owing to distortions in the labour market. It is shown that a public expansion, financed by a distortionary income tax, may give rise to a decrease in unemployment. Even if public goods are pure waste, such an expansion may give rise to an increase in welfare if it is associated with a decrease in unemployment. Since part of the gain from a fiscal expansion is achieved at the expense of welfare in other countries, non-cooperative policies...
