How to tax a spatial monopolist

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Heywood, JS; Pal, D
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; University of Cincinnati
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(95)01541-8
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 107-118
• 关键词: spatial monopoly; unit tax; transport tax; subgame perfect

摘要

This paper models the interaction of a government that maximizes tax revenue and a spatial monopolist that maximizes profit. The government has two tax instruments, a per unit output tax and a transport tax, and the monopolist can strategically alter its location and the mode of transport. If allowed only one tax instrument, then the government chooses the output tax, which generates inefficient strategic choices by the monopolist in order to avoid profit losses. Since the inefficiency is greater than with the transport tax, this isolates a new tradeoff between government tax revenue and economic efficiency.