On the provision of excludable public goods

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fraser, CD
• 署名单位: University of Warwick
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(95)01512-4
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 111-130
• 关键词: self-selection; excludable public good; mandatory provision

摘要

Self-selecting households consume an excludable public good via enabling expenditures-e.g. on TVs and licence fees for broadcasting. We characterise voluntary consumers at an arbitrary all-or-nothing price, and the optimal price a revenue-constrained welfare-maximiser facing voluntary consumers chooses. These are compared with those from universal provision of the public good via a uniform tax. We show that, inter alia, demand for the good might increase with price; self-selection will produce under-provision. Numerical welfare comparisons show that either mandatory or voluntary participation can be superior, depending on society's income dispersion and inequality aversion.