Imperfect mobility and local government behaviour in an overlapping-generations model

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wildasin, DE; Wilson, JD
• 署名单位: Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Vanderbilt University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(95)01533-7
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 177-198
• 关键词: Local government; Local taxation; labor mobility; overlapping generations; mobility costs

摘要

This paper reconsiders the implications of land-value-maximizing local governments in an overlapping-generations model with imperfect mobility. Specifically, residents develop an 'attachment to place' or 'location-specific capital' once they reside in a town for a single time period. The analysis shows that attempts by governments to capture the resulting rents from less-mobile individuals create inefficient migration, leave all workers worse off in an ex ante sense, and place relatively high burdens on those workers who have high migration costs. Public good levels are also inefficiently chosen.