Environmental consciousness and moral hazard in international agreements to protect the environment

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Petrakis, E; Xepapadeas, A
• 署名单位: University of Crete; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(95)01518-3
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 95-110
• 关键词: transboundary pollution; International agreements; coalitions; STABILITY; moral hazard

摘要

A group of countries that can potentially commit to cooperation to protect the environment are identified as environmentally conscious countries. Conditions are examined under which they can provide self-financing side payments too a second group of less environmentally conscious countries, so that the two groups form a global or partial stable coalition that agrees to reduce emissions. A mechanism that detects cheating is also developed in order to induce the desired emissions even when the emissions level of an individual country cannot be observed by the rest of the participating countries.