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作者：Harbaugh, WT
作者单位：University of Oregon
摘要：Charities publicize the donations they receive, generally according to dollar categories rather than the exact amount. Donors in turn tend to give the minimum amount necessary to get into a category. These facts suggest that donors have a taste for having their donations made public. This paper models the effects of such a taste for prestige on the behavior of donors and charities. I show how a taste for prestige means that charities can increase donations by using categories. The paper also d...
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作者：Hurley, TM; Shogren, JF
作者单位：Iowa State University; University of Wyoming
摘要：Many contests exist where one player does not know his opponent's value of a fixed prize, e.g. unobservable non-market preferences for preservation. This paper explores how changes in the nature of a one-sided information asymmetry affect effort levels in a Cournot Nash contest. The results indicate that the uninformed player's effort is an uncertain input such that his effort is inversely related to risk. This reduces his average odds of success. Comparative static results are driven by the p...
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作者：Anderson, SP; Goeree, JK; Holt, CA
作者单位：University of Virginia
摘要：We formalize an equilibrium model in which altruism and decision-error parameters determine the distribution of contributions for linear and quadratic public goods games. The equilibrium density is exponential for linear games, and normal for quadratic games. Our model implies: (i) contributions increase with the marginal value of the public good, (ii) total contributions increase with the number of participants, (iii) mean contributions lie between the Nash prediction and half the endowment. ...
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作者：Grubert, H
作者单位：United States Department of the Treasury
摘要：How do taxes influence the way U.S. corporations divide foreign affiliate operating income among royalties, dividends, interest, and retained earnings? The paper goes beyond previous work that focused largely on dividend repatriation behavior, and provides a comprehensive analysis of the disposition of foreign subsidiary operating income. The empirical results show that taxes have a large and statistically significant effect on the composition of payments. Own tax prices discourage the payment...
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作者：Benchekroun, H; van Long, N
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; McGill University; Laval University; Concordia University - Canada
摘要：We show that there exists a time-independent tax rule that guides polluting oligopolists to achieve the socially optimum production path. The optimal tax is dependent on the current pollution stock, and it may be negative when the pollution stock is low. A surprising result is that the optimal tax rule may give firms a subsidy for an initial time interval even though under laissez-faire their output always exceeds the socially optimal output. This subsidy, however, induces firms to produce les...
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作者：Marhuenda, F; Ortuno-Ortin, I
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：This paper develops a political model to analyze the stability of income tax schedules. It is assumed that agents perceive any proposed alternative tax policy as more uncertain than the status quo. A tax policy is stable if it is a Condorcet winner. It is well known that in a model without uncertainty the existence of such a policy is very rare. We show, however, that in real cases this might not be a serious problem since small amounts of uncertainty can bring stability to the status quo. It ...
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作者：Rosenthal, EC
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University
摘要：We introduce the following multi-activity public goods problem with excludables. A group of agents with limited budgets is to select a subset of new technologies to be developed. Each technology has a known cost and may provide different returns, which are private information, to the agents. Agents coordinate their activities through a central administrator. Once purchased, technologies are used freely by all contributors. Through examining information provided to the agents and the administra...
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作者：Wildasin, DE; Wilson, JD
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Michigan State University; The World Bank
摘要：When a jurisdiction's land or other fixed resources are owned by non-residents, its residents have an incentive to capture the non-residents' rents by imposing confiscatory taxes. When different jurisdictions are subject to less than perfectly correlated risks, such taxes destroy the benefits of risk-pooling that cross-ownership of property otherwise permits. If jurisdictions must use property taxes (i,e, taxes on both immobile land and mobile capital) instead of taxes on land alone, they will...
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作者：Nelissen, JHM
作者单位：Tilburg University
摘要：In this study we compare the redistributive impact of the Dutch social security on an annual basis with the lifetime redistributive impact. The analysis confirms the theoretical notion that the lifetime impact is smaller than the annual incidence studies suggest. This holds especially for old-age pensions and social assistance and, to a lesser extent, the disability state pension. We also find that, for the Netherlands, the younger the cohort is, the larger the difference. However, employee in...
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作者：Marks, M; Croson, R
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Longwood University
摘要：This study reports the effects of rebate rules on voluntary contributions to a threshold public good. Rebate rules specify how excess contributions, over the threshold amount are distributed. We examine three rebate rules experimentally: a no rebate policy where excess contributions are discarded, a proportional rebate policy where excess contributions are rebated proportionally to an individual's contribution, and a utilization rebate policy where excess contributions provide some continuous ...
