Information and strategyproofness in joint project selection

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rosenthal, EC
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00089-3
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 207-221
• 关键词: excludable public goods; mechanism design; INFORMATION; strategyproof; bounded rationality

摘要

We introduce the following multi-activity public goods problem with excludables. A group of agents with limited budgets is to select a subset of new technologies to be developed. Each technology has a known cost and may provide different returns, which are private information, to the agents. Agents coordinate their activities through a central administrator. Once purchased, technologies are used freely by all contributors. Through examining information provided to the agents and the administrator, we create a bounded rationality environment and provide a strategy proof selection and cost allocation mechanism under a particular decision criterion. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.