Risky local tax bases: risk-pooling vs rent-capture

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wildasin, DE; Wilson, JD
• 署名单位: Vanderbilt University; Michigan State University; The World Bank
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00028-0
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 229-247
• 关键词: Capital taxation; land taxation; local government; property taxation; RISK

摘要

When a jurisdiction's land or other fixed resources are owned by non-residents, its residents have an incentive to capture the non-residents' rents by imposing confiscatory taxes. When different jurisdictions are subject to less than perfectly correlated risks, such taxes destroy the benefits of risk-pooling that cross-ownership of property otherwise permits. If jurisdictions must use property taxes (i,e, taxes on both immobile land and mobile capital) instead of taxes on land alone, they will compete for mobile capital by keeping tax rates low. If capital is sufficiently substitutable for immobile factors, tax rates will be low enough to achieve greater effective diversification of risks and higher welfare. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.