Alternative rebate rules in the provision of a threshold public good: An experimental investigation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Marks, M; Croson, R
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Longwood University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00067-4
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 195-220
• 关键词: threshold; public good; rebates; experiment

摘要

This study reports the effects of rebate rules on voluntary contributions to a threshold public good. Rebate rules specify how excess contributions, over the threshold amount are distributed. We examine three rebate rules experimentally: a no rebate policy where excess contributions are discarded, a proportional rebate policy where excess contributions are rebated proportionally to an individual's contribution, and a utilization rebate policy where excess contributions provide some continuous public good. Significantly more Nash equilibrium outcomes are observed under the no rebate treatment than under either of the other two. Interestingly, the variance of contributions differs significantly between rebate treatments. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.