Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Benchekroun, H; van Long, N
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal; McGill University; Laval University; Concordia University - Canada
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00038-3
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 325-342
• 关键词: pollution; oligopoly; taxation; incentive; dynamic games

摘要

We show that there exists a time-independent tax rule that guides polluting oligopolists to achieve the socially optimum production path. The optimal tax is dependent on the current pollution stock, and it may be negative when the pollution stock is low. A surprising result is that the optimal tax rule may give firms a subsidy for an initial time interval even though under laissez-faire their output always exceeds the socially optimal output. This subsidy, however, induces firms to produce less than they would under laissez-faire. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.