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作者：Pancs, Romans; Vriend, Nicolaas J.
作者单位：University of London; Stanford University
摘要：Schelling [Schelling, T.C., 1969. Models of Segregation. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 59, 488-493, Schelling, T.C., 1971a. Dynamic Models of Segregation. Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 1 (2), 143-186, Schelling, T.C., 1971b. On the Ecology of Micromotives. The Public Interest, 25, 61-98, Schelling, T.C., 1978. Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: Norton.] presented a microeconomic model showing how an integrated city could unravel to a rather segregated city, notw...
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作者：Andreoni, James; Kanbur, Ravi
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作者：Coelli, Michael B.; Green, David A.; Warburton, William P.
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of Melbourne; University of London; University College London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of British Columbia
摘要：We examine the impact of high school graduation on the probability individuals from welfare backgrounds use welfare themselves. Our data consist of administrative educational records for grade 12 students in a Canadian province linked with their own and their parents' welfare records. We address potential endogeneity problems by: 1) controlling for ability using past test scores; 2) using an instrument for graduation based on school principal fixed effects; and 3) using a Heckman-Singer type u...
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作者：Fuest, Clemens; Kolmar, Martin
作者单位：University of Cologne; University of St Gallen
摘要：We develop a two-region model where the decentralized provision of spillover goods and other public expenditures is financed by means of user fees. We show that a decentralized solution tends to be inefficient. If the regional spillover goods are substitutes, user fees tend to be inefficiently low, whereas they tend to be inefficiently high if the spillover goods are complements. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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作者：Hellwig, Martin F.
作者单位：Max Planck Society
摘要：For the standard specification of the utilitarian optimal income tax problem with hidden characteristics, the paper shows that randomized tax schemes are undesirable if preferences exhibit a property of weakly decreasing risk aversion according to the multi dimensional risk aversion concept of Hellwig [Hellwig, M.F., 2004, Risk Aversion in the Small and the Large with Multidimensional Outcomes. Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn. Preprint 2004/6, http://www.mpp-rdg.mpg...
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作者：Calabrese, Stephen; Epple, Dennis; Romano, Richard
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Florida; National Bureau of Economic Research; Carnegie Mellon University; State University System of Florida; University of South Florida
摘要：Households choose a community in a metropolitan area and collectively set a minimum housing quality and a property tax to finance a local public good. The collective imposition of a lower bound on housing consumption induces an income-stratified equilibrium in a specification where meaningful community differentiation would not arise without zoning. We show computationally that zoning restrictions are likely to be stringent, with a majority facing a binding constraint in communities that permi...
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作者：Schaltegger, Christoph A.; Torgler, Benno
作者单位：University of St Gallen; Yale University
摘要：Government accountability through electoral engagement, involvement and participation in the political debate can affect government performance. Using data for the full sample of Swiss cantons over the 1981-2001 period, this paper provides empirical evidence that government accountability is crucial for fiscal discipline. Specifically, in cantons with high levels of government accountability, the level of indebtedness is significantly lower, indicating that accountability supports fiscal disci...
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作者：Hastings, Justine S.; Kane, Thomas J.; Staiger, Douglas O.; Weinstein, Jeffrey M.
作者单位：Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; Dartmouth College
摘要：There is little causal evidence on the effect of economic and policy outcomes on voting behavior. This paper uses randomized outcomes from a school choice lottery to examine if lottery outcomes affect voting behavior in a school board election. We show that losing the lottery has no significant impact on overall voting behavior; however, among white families, those with above median income and prior voting history, lottery losers were significantly more likely to vote than lottery winners. Usi...
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作者：Besley, Timothy; Smart, Michael
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper explores the logic of fiscal restraints in a political agency model with both moral hazard and adverse selection. The role of the political process is both to discipline incumbents who may act against the public interest and to sort in those politicians who are most likely act in voters' interests. We use the model to examine the optimality of inefficient taxation, limits on the size of government, increasing transparency, and yardstick competition. Some conclusions are surprising. ...
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作者：Blackorby, Charles; Murty, Sushama
作者单位：University of Warwick; Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：We show that if a monopoly sector is imbedded in a general equilibrium framework and profits are taxed at one hundred percent, then unit (specific) taxation and ad valorem taxation are equivalent on the set of Pareto optima. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
