A theory of user-fee competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fuest, Clemens; Kolmar, Martin
• 署名单位: University of Cologne; University of St Gallen
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.10.008
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 497-509
• 关键词: Public goods; Club goods; user fees; Fiscal federalism

摘要

We develop a two-region model where the decentralized provision of spillover goods and other public expenditures is financed by means of user fees. We show that a decentralized solution tends to be inefficient. If the regional spillover goods are substitutes, user fees tend to be inefficiently low, whereas they tend to be inefficiently high if the spillover goods are complements. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.