On the political economy of zoning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Calabrese, Stephen; Epple, Dennis; Romano, Richard
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; University of Florida; National Bureau of Economic Research; Carnegie Mellon University; State University System of Florida; University of South Florida
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.09.004
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 25-49
• 关键词: zoning; stratification; voting; public goods

摘要

Households choose a community in a metropolitan area and collectively set a minimum housing quality and a property tax to finance a local public good. The collective imposition of a lower bound on housing consumption induces an income-stratified equilibrium in a specification where meaningful community differentiation would not arise without zoning. We show computationally that zoning restrictions are likely to be stringent, with a majority facing a binding constraint in communities that permit it. By inducing a stratified equilibrium, zoning causes Tiebout-welfare gains in aggregate but with large welfare transfers. Relative to stratified equilibrium without zoning, the zoning equilibrium is significantly more efficient as it reduces housing-market distortions. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.