Government accountability and fiscal discipline: A panel analysis using Swiss data

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schaltegger, Christoph A.; Torgler, Benno
• 署名单位: University of St Gallen; Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.07.003
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 117-140
• 关键词: government accountability; fiscal performance; indebtedness; Social capital

摘要

Government accountability through electoral engagement, involvement and participation in the political debate can affect government performance. Using data for the full sample of Swiss cantons over the 1981-2001 period, this paper provides empirical evidence that government accountability is crucial for fiscal discipline. Specifically, in cantons with high levels of government accountability, the level of indebtedness is significantly lower, indicating that accountability supports fiscal discipline. To obtain a useful approximation for government accountability between citizens and their representatives, we use information from direct voter participation in political decisions (initiatives and public referenda) in Swiss state (cantonal) governments. Electoral support of government proposals reveals an important aspect of accountability in a real world setting. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.