-
作者：Devereux, Michael P.; Griffith, Rachel; Simpson, Helen
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Oxford; University of London; University College London; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：We examine whether discretionary government grants influence where domestic and multinational firms locate new plants, and how the presence of agglomeration externalities interacts with these policy instruments. We find that a region's existing industrial structure has an effect on the location of new entrants. Grants do have a small effect in attracting plants to specific geographic areas, but importantly, we find that firms are less responsive to government subsidies in areas where there are...
-
作者：Calvo-Armengol, Antoni; Verdier, Thieny; Zenou, Yves
作者单位：ICREA; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universite de Toulouse; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); University of Maine System; University of Maine Orono
摘要：This paper analyzes the interplay between social structure and information exchange in two competing activities, crime and labor. We consider a dynamic model in which individuals belong to mutually exclusive two-person groups, referred to as dyads. There are multiple equilibria. If jobs are badly paid and/or crime is profitable, unemployment benefits have to be low enough to prevent workers for staying too long in the unemployment status because they are vulnerable to crime activities. If, ins...
-
作者：Dasgupta, Indraneel; Kanbur, Ravi
作者单位：University of Nottingham; Cornell University
摘要：We investigate how vertical unity within a community interacts with horizontal class divisions of an unequal income distribution. Community is conceptualized in terms of a public good to which all those in the community have equal access, but from which outsiders are excluded. We formulate the idea of redistributive tension, or class antagonism, in terms of the costs that poorer individuals would be willing to impose on the rich, to achieve a given gain in personal income. Our conclusion is th...
-
作者：Duffy, John; Ochs, Jack; Vesterlund, Lise
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：Schelling Charitable contributions are frequently made over time. Donors are free to contribute whenever they wish and as often as they want, and are frequently updated on the level of contributions by others. A dynamic structure enables donors to condition their contribution on that of others, and, as Schelling [Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960.] suggested, it may establish trust thereby increasing charitable giving. Marx and Matthew...
-
作者：Messer, Kent D.; Zarghamee, Homa
作者单位：University of Delaware; Santa Clara University; Cornell University
摘要：This research examines how three common contextual factors can affect contributions in the linear voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM). Using business student subjects and a low marginal per capita rate of return, the results show that contributions in the last of ten rounds range from 18% for the traditional VCM with no initial cheap talk, no voting, and a status quo of not giving to 94% in a VCM with initial cheap talk, voting, and a status quo of giving. The results demonstrate that cont...
-
作者：Vendrik, Maarten C. M.; Woltjer, Geert B.
作者单位：Hasselt University; Maastricht University
摘要：A central finding in happiness research is that a person's life satisfaction depends on the level of her income relative to the average income in her social reference group. This dependence of life satisfaction on relative income can be related to the reference dependence of the value function in Kahneman and Tversky's [Kahneman, D., Tversky, A., 1979. Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47, 263-291] prospect theory. In this paper we investigate whether the charac...
-
作者：Horstmann, Ignatius J.; Scharf, Kimberley; Slivinski, Al
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); University of Warwick; University of Toronto; University of Toronto
摘要：This paper explores the theoretical relationship between tax relief for private giving and individual location choice. Tax relief for giving may receive political support at the local level because of its distributional effects; however, through its effects on public provision choices, such relief may affect individual location decisions and, in so doing, has an impact on the jurisdictional configurations that can arise in equilibrium. For some demographic parameters it will promote economic s...
-
作者：Zamac, Jovan
作者单位：Uppsala University
摘要：This study compares alternative designs of an unfunded pension system. Convex combinations between a fixed contribution rate and a fixed benefit rate are considered. The objective is to maximize the expected ex ante welfare under stochastic fertility. The model is a three-period CGE framework where the financing of education and effects on factor prices are accounted for. Factor prices depend on the degree of capital mobility. For low degrees of capital mobility, it is optimal to have a fixed ...
-
作者：Siqueira, Kevin; Sandler, Todd
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：This paper presents a three-stage proactive game involving terrorists, elected policymakers, and voters. In each of two targeted countries, a representative voter chooses an elected policymaker, charged with deciding proactive countermeasures to ameliorate a transnational terrorist threat. Two primary considerations drive the voters' strategic choice: free riding on the other countries' countermeasures and limiting a reprisal terrorist attack. The resulting low proactive countermeasures benefi...
-
作者：Cullen, Julie Berry; Gordon, Roger H.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：How does the tax law affect individual incentives to engage in entrepreneurial risk taking? We first show theoretically that taxes can affect incentives due to differences in tax rates on business vs. wage income, due to differences in the marginal tax rates faced on losses vs. profits through a progressive rate structure and through the option to incorporate, and due to risk sharing with the government. We then provide empirical evidence using U.S. individual tax return data that each of thes...
