Fiscal restraints and voter welfare

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Besley, Timothy; Smart, Michael
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.09.009
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 755-773
• 关键词: Political agency; public choice; TRANSPARENCY; Yardstick competition

摘要

This paper explores the logic of fiscal restraints in a political agency model with both moral hazard and adverse selection. The role of the political process is both to discipline incumbents who may act against the public interest and to sort in those politicians who are most likely act in voters' interests. We use the model to examine the optimality of inefficient taxation, limits on the size of government, increasing transparency, and yardstick competition. Some conclusions are surprising. For example, we show that some forms of fiscal restraint can only be desirable when incumbents are sufficiently likely to be benevolent. (c) 2006 Published by Elsevier B.V.