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作者：Dischinger, Matthias; Riedel, Nadine
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Munich; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University Hohenheim
摘要：Intangible assets, like patents and trademarks, are increasingly seen as the key to competitive success and as the drivers of corporate profit. Moreover, they constitute a major source of profit shifting opportunities in multinational enterprises (MNEs) due to a highly intransparent transfer pricing process. This paper argues that, for both reasons, MNEs have an incentive to locate intangible property at affiliates with a relatively low corporate tax rate. Using panel data on European MNEs and...
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作者：Meer, Jonathan
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：While the effects of peer pressure in charitable giving have been of considerable interest to social scientists, there is little empirical evidence on the magnitude of these effects. A correlation between giving or volunteering by one's peers and one's own giving can be driven by self-selection into groups, common shocks that inspire both the solicitor to ask and the individual to give, or social influence. Using data from a university, this paper analyzes whether alumni are more likely to giv...
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作者：Bracha, Anat; Menietti, Michael; Vesterlund, Lise
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Boston
摘要：The public phase of a capital campaign is typically launched with the announcement of a large seed donation. Andreoni (1998) argues that such a fundraising strategy may be particularly effective when funds are being raised for projects that have fixed production costs. The reason is that when there are fixed costs of production simultaneous giving may result in both positive and zero provision equilibria. Thus absent announcements donors may get stuck in an equilibrium that fails to provide a ...
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作者：Llavador, Humberto; Solano-Garcia, Angel
作者单位：University of Granada; University of Granada; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：This paper analyzes the political economy of immigration when the salient electoral issue is the level of immigrants and the relevant immigration policy is the expenditure in immigration control. We consider that immigration affects voters' welfare through economic and non-economic factors. We model political competition a la Wittman with the ideology of parties endogenously determined at equilibrium. At equilibrium, parties propose different levels of immigration, located to the left and to t...
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作者：Castillo, Marco; Ferraro, Paul J.; Jordan, Jeffrey L.; Petrie, Ragan
作者单位：George Mason University; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：We experimentally investigate the distribution of children's time preferences along gender and racial lines. We find that boys are more impatient than girls and black children are more impatient than white children. Black boys have the highest discount rates of all groups. Most importantly, we show that impatience has a direct correlation with behavior that is predictive of economic success. An increase of one standard deviation in the discount rate is associated with an increase in the number...
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作者：Lehmann, Etienne; Parmentier, Alexis; Van Der Linden, Bruno
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Universite Paris Saclay; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：We characterize optimal redistributive taxation when individuals are heterogeneous in their skills and their values of non-market activities. Search-matching frictions on the labor markets create unemployment. Wages, labor demand and participation are endogenous. Average tax rates are increasing at the optimum. This shifts wages below their laissez faire value and distorts labor demand upwards. The marginal tax rate is positive at the top of the skill distribution even when the latter is bound...
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作者：Fehr, Ernst; Leibbrandt, Andreas
作者单位：University of Chicago; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Zurich
摘要：This paper examines the role of cooperativeness and impatience in the exploitation of common pool resources (CPRs) by combining laboratory experiments with field data. We study fishermen whose main, and often only, source of income stems from the use of fishing grounds with open access. The exploitation of a CPR involves a negative interpersonal and inter-temporal externality because individuals who exploit the CPR reduce the current and the future yield both for others and for themselves. Eco...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Golosov, Mikhail; Tsyvinski, Aleh
作者单位：Yale University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study the dynamic taxation of capital and labor in the Ramsey model under the assumption that taxes and public good provision are decided by a self-interested politician who cannot commit to policies. We show that, as long as the politician is as patient as the citizens, the Chamley-Judd result of zero long-run taxes holds. In contrast, if the politician is less patient than the citizens, the best (subgame perfect) equilibrium from the viewpoint of the citizens involves long-run capital tax...
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作者：Ambrus, Attila; Pathak, Parag A.
作者单位：Harvard University; Harvard University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper shows that the presence of different types of players - those who only care about their own material payoffs and those who reciprocate others' contributions - can explain the robust features of observed contribution patterns in public good contribution games, even without the presence of asymmetric information. We show what conditions on reciprocity are sufficient for a unique perfect equilibrium, in which contributions are decreasing. Under these conditions, selfish players have en...
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作者：Bandiera, Oriana; Levy, Gilat
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper analyzes whether political outcomes in local democracies are determined by the preferences of the median -typically poor-agents or whether they reflect the wishes of the wealthy elites. Theory suggests that when politicians belonging to different groups can form coalitions, the wealthy elites' influence on policy choices is endogenously higher when there is diversity in preferences among the poor. The pattern of public good provision by local governments in Indonesia is consistent w...
