Immigration policy with partisan parties

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Llavador, Humberto; Solano-Garcia, Angel
• 署名单位: University of Granada; University of Granada; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.09.011
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 134-142
• 关键词: immigration; Ideological parties; Unskilled and skilled labor

摘要

This paper analyzes the political economy of immigration when the salient electoral issue is the level of immigrants and the relevant immigration policy is the expenditure in immigration control. We consider that immigration affects voters' welfare through economic and non-economic factors. We model political competition a la Wittman with the ideology of parties endogenously determined at equilibrium. At equilibrium, parties propose different levels of immigration, located to the left and to the right of the median voter's ideal point, and combine skilled and unskilled workers among their constituencies. Numerical simulations provide the levels of immigration proposed by the two parties and the composition of parties' constituencies as we vary the efficacy of immigration control and the intensity of immigration aversion. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.