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作者：Slemrod, Joel
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作者：Harris, Douglas N.; Sass, Tim R.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We study the effects of various types of education and training on the productivity of teachers in promoting student achievement. Previous studies on the subject have been hampered by inadequate measures of teacher training and difficulties in addressing the non-random selection of teachers to students and of teachers to training. We address these issues by estimating models that include detailed measures of pre-service and in-service training, a rich set of time-varying covariates, and studen...
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作者：Picard, Pierre M.; Pieretti, Patrice
作者单位：University of Luxembourg; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：This paper discusses the effects of pressure policies on offshore financial centers as well as their ability to enforce the compliance of those centers with anti-money laundering regulations. Offshore banks can be encouraged to comply with rigorous monitoring of an investor's identity and the origin of his/her funds when pressure creates a sufficiently high risk of reputational harm to the investor. We show that such pressure policies harm both offshore and onshore investors and can benefit bo...
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作者：Reinikka, Ritva; Svensson, Jakob
作者单位：The World Bank; Stockholm University
摘要：In this paper we argue that innovations in governance of social services are an effective way to improve outcomes such as attainment of universal primary education. To test this hypothesis we exploit an unusual policy experiment: a newspaper campaign in Uganda aimed at reducing the capture of public funds by providing schools (parents) with systematic information to monitor local officials' handling of a large education grant program. Combining survey and administrative data, we show that publ...
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作者：Dhillon, Amrita; Rigolini, Jamele
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：We examine how formal and informal contract enforcing institutions interact in a competitive market with asymmetric information where consumers do not observe quality before purchase. Firm level incentives for producing high quality can be achieved with an informal enforcement mechanism, reputation, the efficacy of which is enhanced by consumers investing in connectedness: or with a formal mechanism, legal enforcement, the effectiveness of which can be reduced by means of bribes. We show that ...
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作者：Gibbons, Stephen; Telhaj, Shqiponja
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Sussex
摘要：Pupil mobility between schools is something to be encouraged if it facilitates the efficient matching of pupils to provision, but discouraged if turnover imposes costs on other pupils through disruption in teaching and learning. With this in mind, we consider the externalities imposed by entrants on the achievements of incumbent pupils in English primary schools. We find that immobile pupils who experience high pupil entry rates in their yeargroups (a la US grades) progress less well academica...
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作者：Huber, John D.; Stanig, Piero
作者单位：Columbia University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We analyze how religion affects voting and redistribution. Our model directs attention away from the particular faith, belief or risk attitudes of religious individuals, and emphasizes instead how organized religion opens the door to standard group-based distributive politics. We argue that organized religion makes it possible for the rich and the religious poor to form electoral coalitions in favor of low taxes and limited redistribution. The losers are the secular poor. However, the material...
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作者：Koethenbuerger, Marko
作者单位：University of Copenhagen
摘要：Previous literature widely assumes that taxes are optimized in local public finance while expenditures adjust residually. This paper endogenizes the choice of the optimization variable. In particular, it analyzes how federal policy toward local governments' influences the way local governments decide on public policy. Unlike the usual presumption, the paper shows that local governments may choose to optimize over expenditures. The result holds when federal policy subsidizes local taxation. The...
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作者：Nishiyama, Shinichi
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
摘要：The present paper analyzes the budgetary, macroeconomic, and welfare effects of tax-deferred retirement saving accounts, similar to U.S. 401(k) plans, in a dynamic general-equilibrium overlapping-generations economy with heterogeneous households. Because of the initial deferral of tax payments, the short-run budgetary cost of tax-deferred accounts is significantly higher than the long-run cost. Therefore, the budget-neutral introduction of tax-deferred accounts would make current and near-futu...
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作者：Brekke, Kurt R.; Holmas, Tor Helge; Rune Straume, Odd
作者单位：Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); Universidade do Minho; University of Bergen
摘要：We study the impact of regulation on competition between brand-names and generics and pharmaceutical expenditures using a unique policy experiment in Norway, where reference pricing (RP) replaced price cap regulation in 2003 for a sub-sample of off-patent products. First, we construct a vertical differentiation model to analyze the impact of regulation on prices and market shares of brand-names and generics. Then, we exploit a detailed panel data set at product level covering several off-paten...
