Seeds to succeed? Sequential giving to public projects

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Bracha, Anat; Menietti, Michael; Vesterlund, Lise
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Boston
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.10.007
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 416-427
• 关键词: Fundraising; Seed money; Sequential giving; Charitable giving; COORDINATION; public goods

摘要

The public phase of a capital campaign is typically launched with the announcement of a large seed donation. Andreoni (1998) argues that such a fundraising strategy may be particularly effective when funds are being raised for projects that have fixed production costs. The reason is that when there are fixed costs of production simultaneous giving may result in both positive and zero provision equilibria. Thus absent announcements donors may get stuck in an equilibrium that fails to provide a desirable public project Andreoni (1998) demonstrates that such inferior outcomes can be eliminated when the fundraiser initially secures a sufficiently large seed donation. We investigate this model experimentally to determine whether announcements of seed money eliminate the inefficiencies that may result under fixed costs and simultaneous provision. To assess the strength of the theory we examine the effect of announcements in both the presence and absence of fixed costs. Our findings are supportive of the theory for sufficiently high fixed costs. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.