Civil service reform

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ujhelyi, Gergely
• 署名单位: University of Houston System; University of Houston
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.06.009
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 15-25
• 关键词: Civil service rules; bureaucrats; Political agency

摘要

Civil service rules governing the selection and motivation of bureaucrats are among the defining institutions of modern democracies. Although this is an active area of reform in the US and elsewhere, economic analyses of the issue are virtually nonexistent. This paper provides a welfare evaluation of civil service reform. It describes the effect of reform on the interaction of politicians, voters, and bureaucrats, and shows that society often faces trade-offs between improving the bureaucracy and improving the performance of politicians. My results characterize the conditions under which merit-based recruitment and civil service protections such as tenure can improve welfare. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.