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作者：Fabra, Natalia; von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik; Harbord, David
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Oslo
摘要：Motivated by the new auction format in the England and Wales electricity market, as well as the recent debate in California, we characterize bidding behavior and market outcomes in uniform and discriminatory electricity auctions. Uniform auctions result in higher average prices than discriminatory auctions, but the ranking in terms of productive efficiency is ambiguous. The comparative effects of other market design features, such as the number of steps in suppliers' bid functions, the duratio...
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作者：Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F.
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：We provide a model wherein oligopolists produce differentiated products that also have a safety attribute. Consumption of these products may lead to harm (to consumers and/or third parties), lawsuits, and compensation, either via settlement or trial. Firm-level costs reflect both safety investment and production activities, as well as liability-related costs. Compensation is incomplete, both because of inefficiencies in the bargaining process and (possibly) because of statutorily established l...
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作者：Chakraborty, Archishman; Gupta, Nandini; Harbaugh, Rick
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：Should a seller with private information sell the best or worst goods first? Considering the sequential auction of two stochastically equivalent goods, we find that the seller has an incentive to impress buyers by selling the better good first because the seller's sequencing strategy endogenously generates correlation in the values of the goods across periods. When this impression effect is strong enough, selling the better good first is the unique pure-strategy equilibrium. By credibly reveal...
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作者：Lommerud, Kjell Erik; Straume, Odd Rune; Sorgard, Lars
作者单位：University of Bergen; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：We analyze how the presence of trade unions affects the pattern of mergers in an international oligopoly and the welfare implications thereof. We find that wages for the merger participants are always lower when they merge internationally, rather than nationally. Using a model of endogenous merger formation, we find that the firms will merge internationally in equilibrium. There are more international mergers than socially preferred, unless products are close substitutes. A national champion p...
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作者：Chiappori, Pierre-Andre; Jullien, Bruno; Salanie, Bernard; Salanie, Francois
作者单位：Columbia University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; INRAE; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：Several recent articles on empirical contract theory and insurance have tested for a positive correlation between coverage and ex post risk, as predicted by standard models of pure adverse selection or pure moral hazard. We show here that the positive correlation property can be extended to general setups: competitive insurance markets and cases where risk aversion is public. We test our results on a French dataset. Our tests confirm that the estimated correlation is positive; they also sugges...
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作者：Klepper, Steven; Thompson, Peter
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; State University System of Florida; Florida International University
摘要：We construct a model of industry evolution in which the central force for change is the creation and destruction of submarkets. Firms expand when they are able to exploit new opportunities that arrive in the form of submarkets; they contract and ultimately exit when the submarkets in which they operate are destroyed. This simple framework can transparently explain a wide range of well-known regularities about industry dynamics, most notably the subtle relationships between size, age, growth, a...
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作者：Davis, Peter
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Retail markets are extremely important, but economists have few practical tools for analyzing the way dispersed buyers and sellers affect the properties of markets. I develop an econometric model of retail demand in which products are location specific and consumers have preferences over both geographic proximity and other store and product characteristics. The model uses data on the observed geographic distribution of consumers within a market to (I) help explain observed variation in market ...
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作者：Martimort, David; Sand-Zantman, Wilfried
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse
摘要：We analyze the shape of contracts between local governments and the contractors they hire to run public facilities on their behalf. Governments are privately informed about the quality of the facility, while risk-neutral contractors undertake a nonverifiable operating effort. The design of the contract signals the quality of the facility in such a way that the better this quality, the greater the share of operating risk kept by the government. This feature reduces the agent's marginal incentiv...
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作者：Severinov, Sergei; Deneckere, Raymond
作者单位：Duke University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We characterize the optimal screening mechanism for a monopolist facing consumers with privately known demands, some of whom have limited abilities to misrepresent their preferences. We show that consumers with better abilities to misrepresent information benefit from the presence of consumers who lack such abilities. Whenever the fraction of the latter group is positive, there is no exclusion: the firm supplies a positive quantity of the good to all consumers whose valuations exceed marginal ...
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作者：Hiriart, Yolande; Martimort, David
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite de Toulouse
摘要：We characterize the optimal regulation of a firm that undertakes an environmentally risky activity. This firm (the agent) is protected by limited liability and bound by contract to a stakeholder (the principal). The level of safety care exerted by the agent is nonobservable. This level of care depends both on the degree of incompleteness of the regulatory contract and on the allocation of bargaining power between the principal and the agent. Increasing the wealth of the principal that can be s...
