National versus international mergers in unionized oligopoly

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Lommerud, Kjell Erik; Straume, Odd Rune; Sorgard, Lars
• 署名单位: University of Bergen; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00013.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 212-234
• 关键词: economic-integration; trade liberalization; MARKET; COMPETITION; profitability; policies; welfare

摘要

We analyze how the presence of trade unions affects the pattern of mergers in an international oligopoly and the welfare implications thereof. We find that wages for the merger participants are always lower when they merge internationally, rather than nationally. Using a model of endogenous merger formation, we find that the firms will merge internationally in equilibrium. There are more international mergers than socially preferred, unless products are close substitutes. A national champion policy of promoting domestic mergers rather than international ones is nevertheless never optimal.